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I\TRODUCTION
Even while Colonel Muammar Qaddafi's body was still on
public display in Libya, the popular business networking site,
Linkedln, became abuzz with companies exploring
opportunities in the country.' One man, Mabruk Swayah, a self-
*J.D. Candidate, May 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2009, George
Washington University. The Author would like to thank Kara Baquizal tr her hard
work in editing the Author's Note, her candor, and her constant motivation. The
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identified Libyan businessman wrote: "Hi friends you all are
welcome to Libya. Just make sure you go through the proper
channels for your work contracts and don't get involved in
bribes, inducements or sweeteners to officials. Remember we
have free media noxw."2
In emerging markets such as Libya, businesses see many
opportunities for profit. These businesses may seek to use any
advantage within their means to obtain a lucrative contract,
including paying bribes to government officials. 4 In fact, in some
countries, paying a bribe to a government official is an expected
and necessary cost of doing business.5 In countries such as India,
bribes infect everyday life.6 A new website created in India titled
"I Paid a Bribe," provides a forum for citizens to share tales of
Author would also like to express her sincere gratitude to Professor Harold Moore for
his invaluable input and perspective; the Fordham International LawJourna1' editors and
staff for their patience and dedicated assistance: and, most imporLantiy, the Author's
family and friends for their support and encouragcment.
1. See Scott Shane, 1est Sees Libya as Rie as Last fJor Bvsnesses, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 29,
2011, at A-N (discussing how Western companies seek prolit-making opportunities in
Libya); see also Hammond: Libya 'Holds Business Opportuities' for UK. BBC (Oct. 21,
2011), http://wiv.bbc.co.uk newsi15403458 [hereinalier Hammond] (mentioning
thc UK business opportunities in Libya, particularly in oil).
2. See Shane, supra note 1.
3. See Hammond, supra note I (providing an example of the United Kingdom
looking to Libya for business opportunitics).
4. See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH..
INTL L. 129, 130 (2010) (noting how a significant problem for many states is that
officials seek bribes on government goods).
5. See Christophcr L. Hall. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Competitive
Disadvantage But For How Long?, 2 TUL. .. NT'L & ComP. L. 289. 291 (1994) (listing
countries that drive economic forces in their geographical regions such as China and
Indonesia and emphasizing that, among these countries, many are among the most
corrupt, where bribery and "grease" payments are de rigeur in international business
negotiations): see also Beverley Earle, Bribeo and Corruption in Eastern Europe, the Baltic
States, and the Commonwealth of Independent States: VVWat Is To Be Done2, 33 CORNELL 1INT'L
L., 483 512 (2000) (noting that Europe, Asia. and thc Americas are not innune fhorn
thc "bribe tax" that afflicts Eastcrn Europe, the Baltic States, and the Commonwealth
of Independcnt States).
6. See Stephanie Strom, Web Sites Shine Light on, Petty Bribey Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 6, 2012, at BI, (noting the prevalence of petty bribery in India); see also
TRANSPARLNCY INTERNATIONAL, (ORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS I1NDEX 3 (2010),
http:/iwv.transparency.orgipolicy-research/sir-7eys-indices/cpi/2010 ,results
(ranking India as the 87th most corrupt country out of 178 countries; Somalia is
ranked the Iost corrupt).
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petty bribery. 7 Of more than 400,000 reports, about eighty
percent detail stories of officials and bureaucrats seeking illicit
payments to provide routine services or to process paperwork8
In addition to this cost, corruption is discouraged in principle9
However, such active discouragement was not always present. 0
Beginning in the 1970s, the United States led the crusade to
fight corruption in international business transactions by
enacting the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA").11 The
FCPA, however, provides an "[e]xception for routine
governmental action," (the "Exception"). 12 The Exception
permits "facilitating or expediting payment[s]" to foreign
officials for services they are legally obligated to perlorm.13 The
purpose behind the Exception is to make it possible to expedite
a necessary service, and not to influence a government decision
in awarding a contract or business opportunity. 14 The US
Congress included the Exception to help US companies
compete in a global marketplace still ruled by rampant
7. See I PAIM A BRIBE, http:/iwwv.ipaidabribe.com (last visited Nov. 3, 2012)
(providing a ±01rtin for victims of corrupt officials demanding bribes to tell their
stories); see also Strom, supra note 6 (discussing the website's purpose).
8. See Stroin, supra note 6 (citing this statistic that demonstrates the prevalence of
petty bribery in India).
9. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 142 (observing the "sincere elorts" of those
countries that have ratified anti-corruption conventions while still questioning whether
those nations have been effective in deterring corruption, describing these efforts as
more ol a "hollow coinmitment"). Carrington emphasizes the weakness ol the global
resolve to punish corrupt practices by providing examples from Lesotho and the
United Kingdom, befire the passage of the Bribery Act. Id. at 143-45.
10. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 131-32 (mentioning the prevalence of bribery
in American firms before the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA")).
11. Foreign Corrupt Pracices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1. 78dd-2, 78dd-3
(1977) [hereinafter FCPA].
12. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (excepting application of the
FCPA's anti-bribery prohibitions foir "any facilitating or expediting payment to a
foreign oflicial, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to
secure the perfoirmance of a routine governmental action by a foreign offitcial, political
party, or party official").
13. Id.
14. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A)-(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(A)-(B), 78dd-3 (f)(4)(A)-
(B) ("The term 'routine governmental action' means only an action which is ordinarily
and commonly periormed by a foreign oflicial ... [it] does not include any decision by
a foreign official ... to award new business to or to continue business with a particular
party.").
A GAINS T INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY
corruption. 15 Subsequently, the US Department of Justice
("DQJ") wrote the Lay Person's Guide to the FCPA as a general
reference document to assist US companies and personnel in
understanding and complying with the statute. 1
These anti-corruption efforts led US officials to work with
the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") to develop global anti-corruption standards. 17
Ultimately, these efforts culminated in the 1997 OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention"). 8
The OECD Convention establishes legally binding standards to
criminalize the bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions. 19 Wghile the OECD
Convention permits the use of small facilitating payments, the
OECD now discourages the use of all facilitating payments20
15. See H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (discussing the competitive disadvantage
the United States would face in business transactions if Congress prohibited all bribes);
see also Earle, supra note 5, at 487 (detailing how US businesses complained that
corruption was an economic reality and that FCPA limitations placed US firms at a
competitive disadvantage).
16. See generally LAY PLRSON'S GUIDE TO THE FCPA, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fi-aud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-guide.pdf
(last visited Nov. 29, 2011) [hereinafter LAY PERSON'S GUIDE].
17. See Earle, supra note 5. at 487-88 (discussing forimer President Bill Clinton's
charge to work through the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD") to level the international playing field for US companies,
culminating in the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
()licials in International Business Transactions ("OEC) Convention")); see also
Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Forei n Corrapt Practices Act - 1977 to 2010. 12
SAN DIEGO INTIL LJ. 89, 98-100 (2010) (noting the United States' encouragement fir
the OECD to enact the OECD Convention and detailing its provisions generally along
with US compliance).
18. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 LL.M. 1. 7 [hereinafter OECD Convention]; see also LAY
PLRSON\S GUIDE, supra note 16 (noting the US executive branch's negotiations with
the ()ECD).
19. See OECD Convention, supra note 18, at 7-8 (noting the purpose of the OECD
Convention).
20. See OECD Working Grp. on Bribery of Foreign Pub. Officials in Int'l Bus.
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, at 4 (Nov. 26, 2009)
(amended Feb. 18, 2010), 1ailable at http://wwv.oecd.org/dataoecd/ll/40/
44176910.pdf [hereinafer OE(CD Recomnicdation] ("[The OECD] [r]econmmends.
in view of the corrosive effect of small facilitation payments .. that Member counries
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Thirtv-four OECD member countries and four non-member
countries have ratified the OECD Convention and have enacted
some form of domestic legislation prohibiting bribes. 21 The
global trend against corruption and the increased prosecution
of companies under the FCPA has led commentators to question
whether the United States should maintain the Exception in the
FCPA.2 The increase in enforcement actions in particular has
led to closer examination of the statute's anti-bribery
provisions.2,
The global trend in preventing corruption is especially
apparent with the recent passage of the United Kingdom's
Bribery Act 2010 ("Bribery Act").24 The Bribery Act has brought
should encourage companies to prohibit or discourage the use of snall facilitating
payments."). The Exception in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, on the other hand,
permits facilitating payments to be any amount, in theory. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (b),
78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (1977) (delineating no limitation to the amount of facilitating
payments permitted to be paid).
21 . See Implementing the Convention, Count by Count. OECD,
http: /,/wwv.oecd.org/ dal/briber- ininternationalbusiness/ anti-
bribel) convention /oecdant i-bribi) cnventionnationalimiplemnentinglegislation.htLl
(last visited Oct. 22. 2012) (noting each incinber countrics' implementation of the
Convention). The thirty four OECD member countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia. Finland, France. Germany, Greece.
Hungar). Iceland, Ireland, Israel. Italy, Japan, Korea. Luxembourg, Mexico,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United States. The fouir non-
Incmber countries are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, and South Aftica. Id.
22. See, e.g, DAVID KLNNLDY & DAN DANIELSEN, OPEN SOC'Y FOUND., BUSTING
BRIBERY: SUSTAINING THE GOBAI MOMENT NI OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT IPRACTICES
ACT 5 (2011), available at http: //wwW.opensoCieLyfoundations.org/sitcs/ default tfiles/
Busting %2520Bribery201 I September.pdf (writing in response to the US Chamber of
Comnerce position and declaring the Chamber's position to be one of promoting
bribe'1)); ANDREW WLISSMANN & ALIXANDRA SMITH, US CHAMBER INST. LEGAL REFORM,
RESTORING BALANCE: PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FORLIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT 5 (2010) (discussing the harm the FCIPA has caused to US business interests and
recommending arnendneInts to the FCPA to make it inore "business tiendly").
23. See gen erally KENNEDY & DANELSEN, supra note 22 (examining the FCPA's
provisions in light of the U.S. Chamber of Comnnerce's proposals to anend the FCPA);
WEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 22 (proposing various anendnents to the FCPA).
24. See Eric Engle, I Get by with a Little Hdp from M1y Friends? , rders tarding the UK
Anti-Briben Statute, by Reference to the OECD Convention and the Foreign Corrapt Practices
Act. 44 INT'L LAw. 1173, 1188 (2010) (observing that the Bribe) Act raises
international standards by elfectively forcing corporations to institute eflective
procedures to prevent bribery); see also Lee G. Dunst et al., Hot Off the Press: Resetting the
Global Anti-Corruption Thermostat to the UK Briber Act. 12 BUS. L. 1INT'L 257. 262 (2011)
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increased attention to the FCPA's provisions as a point of
comparison25 It does not explicitly provide an exception for
facilitating payments. 26 Moreover, the Bribery Act is broader
than the FCPA in application and extraterritorial reach2 7This
difference may have serious implications for US businesses that
may be subject to the Bribery Act's provisions. 28
Recently, there has been considerable debate and
scholarship regarding the FCPA's provisions. Numerous blogs
dedicated to studying FCPA reform and Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") enforcement actions under the
FCPA have sprung up. 29 Some commentators have proposed
amending the statute to remedy the provisions that create a
perceived competitive disadvantage. Others have countered this
position by arguing that a more permissive statute would destroy
US efforts in curbing corruption. This Note evaluates two
approaches to amending the FCPA: 1) one to create a more
aggressive statute and 2) to establish a more business friendly
statute. In this discussion of the FCPA, many scholars and
practitioners have centered their criticism and discussion on the
usefulness of the Exception. This Note argues that the United
(discussing the Bribeiy Act as taking "centre stage" as legal practitioners prepare for its
application).
25. See Dunst et aL., supr note 24, at 262 ("The impact that the Bribery Act has on
multinational corporations will largely be determined by how it diffirs from the
incumbent anti-corruption regime for the multinational corporate communit, which
has up until now largely been the FCPA."); see also F. Joseph Warin Ct al., The British are
Coming.: Britain Changes its Law on Foreign Briben andJoins the International Fight Against
Corrption, 46 TEX. INT'LJ. 1, 7 (2011) (noting that the impact of the Bribery Act "will
be, at least in part, determined by how it differs irom the FCPA.").
26 See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (U.K), available at
http:// .1e gislatioi.gov.iikiikpga/2010/23ipdfs/ukpga20100023_en.pdf
(facilitating payments are not discussed in the statute).
27. Compare Bribe) Act, 2010, c. 23, § 12(5) (U.K.) (containing a broader
extraterritorial application than the FCPA), with 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- (g) (2006)
(detailing the FCPA's extraterritorial reach).
28. See irfra notes 184-93 (highlighting the potential implications for US
companies that may be subject to the Bribei) Act).
29. See THE INVLSTOR'S ADVOCATE: HOW THE SEC PROTECTS I\NVSTORS,
MAINTAINS NlARKLT INTEGRITY. AND FACILITATES (APIMAL FORIMATION, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. (OMM'N, http://wwvw.sct.gov/about/whatwedo.shtln (last visited Aug. 13, 2012)
[hereinafter SEC Guide] (describing how the Securities and Exchange Commission
regulates US securities exchanges to protect investors and promote efficient markets
and capital formation.).
2012] 1889
1890 FORDHAM IN\TERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1884
States should repeal the Exception, thus creating a more
aggressive anti-corruption statute. It emphasizes the
disadvantages of employing the Exception, and in light of the
Bribery Act, urges the United States to once again lead the fight
to curb global corruption. Part I discusses the histoty and
specific provisions of both the FCPA and Briberi7 Act while
highlighting the United States' historical lead in enacting anti-
bribery legislation by encouraging the creation of the OECD
Convention. Part Ii details two different approaches to amend
the FCPA. Part III concludes by emphasizing that the global
trend disfavors the use of facilitating payments, arguing that
repealing the Exception would resolve the risks associated with
facilitating payments, and noting the importance of re-
establishing US dominance in fighting corruption.
I. BA CKGRO ND AN1) STA TUTOR Y PRO VISIONS
To justify the repeal of the Exception, the history behind
the FCPA's passage and the original justification for the
Exception's inclusion must be considered. Its history explains
the United States' rationale for creating an Exception. The
current international stance towards the Exception, however,
discourages and largely prohibits its use. Part I examines the
histot-y behind the enactment of the FCPA and the prevalent
international stance regarding the facilitating payments
exception. Part I.A begins by discussing the events that led the
US Congress to enact the FCPA and reviews the important
provisions of the statute. Part I.B. examines the United States'
role as a leader in combating bribery abroad and surveys the
development of the OECD Convention modeled after the FCPA.
Part LC details the prevalent international stance towards
facilitating payments with a focus on the OECD and Bribery Act.
A. Histo
, 
of the FCPA
Prior to the 1970s, the payment of bribes was not illegal and
thus, there were a significant number of bribes paid overseas by
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US businessmen."" The 1972 Watergate scandal alerted Congress
and the press to endemic corruption in US business and
politics. , As part of the investigation into the Watergate
wiretapping, a Watergate special prosecutor uncovered
corporate slush funds that US companies had used to make
questionable international payments. 32 A subsequent "SEC"
investigation revealed widespread use of false accounting
methods to conceal bribes paid to foreign officials. , The SEC
feared a crisis in the self-reporting system) 4 This self-reporting
system requires US companies to provide full and accurate
disclosure in SEC filings of the use of corporate funds.35 The
30. See Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. 33 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 83. 84 (2007) (noting how the FCPA was the first
legislation in the world to recognize and seek to curb the contribution of companies to
foreign corruption).
31. See Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation.: VV7at Is to Be Done With the
Foreigr, Corrupt Practies AcLt, 20 VAND.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 433 (1987) (reviewing the
origins of the FCPA). The Watergate scandal involved the arrest of burglars in the
Democratic National Comminittee office commissioned by individuals in fornmer
President Nixon's reelection committee. The subsequent investigation uncovered
widespread political corruption and led the US government to initiate official
investigations. See The Watergate Stor, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 2011,
http: /www.washingtonpost. coi/wp-sipolitics specialiwatergate /part .html ("So
began the chain of events that would convulse 'Washington for two years, lead to the
first resignation of a US president and change American politics forever.").
32. See MIRiNA F. WEISNLANN, CRIME 1INCORPORATLD: LLGAL AND FINANCIAL
IMPIICATIONS OF CORPORATE MISCONDUCT 94 (2009) (discussing the events that led to
the discovery of illicit funds); see also H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritoriai jrisdiction Uuder
the 1998 Amnendments to the Foreign Corrupt Pc,,i A'c : Does the G,,r meI t- Reach Now
Exceed its Grasp?. 26 N.C. J. INT'L L. & CO . REG. 239, 241 (2001) (noting the
subsequent investigations and discoveries made after tire Watergate scandal).
33. See XEISMANN, supra note 33, at 94 (noting tihe most famous case that involved
Gulf Oil and its Vice President, Claude C. Wilde where SEC investigators discovered
that fron 1960 to 1973, Gulf Oil spent dmore than USS1( inllion dollars on illegal
political activities and in business transactions abroad); see also Carrington, supra note
4, at 132 (discussing tihe role of the SEC after the Watergate scandal findings).
34. See vVEISMANN, supra note 32, at 94 (noting the SEC response to the mounting
evidence of corruption). The SEC is the American government agency responsible for
overseeing the key participants in the securities world by cnirtocing US securities laws
and regulating the industr
. 
See SEC GUIDE, supra note 29" (providing a general
description of the mission of the SEC).
35. See SEC GUIDE, supra note 29 (declaring that the laws and rules that govern
the US securities industry derive front thie concept that all investors should have access
to certain basic facts about an investment: thus, the SEC requires public companies to
disclose mcaningful financial and other information to the public); see also WTEISMANN,
supra note 32, at 94 (describing the self reporting system and its importance).
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SEC recognized that widespread corruption could impede the
self-regulator
- 
system of corporate responsibility. To ascertain
the extent of corruption, the SEC implemented a voluntary
disclosure program that allowed US companies to self-report
wrongdoing to the SEC while avoiding punishment. 37
In 1977, the SEC issued a report detailing the results of this
voluntary disclosure program. :"s The results were alarming. "
More than 400 companies admitted to making questionable
payments. 40 These payments exceeded US$300 million in
corporate slush funds to non-US officials or politicians.41 Over
117 of the self-reporting companies ranked in the top Fortune
500 companies. 42 As a result, during the summer and fall of
1975, the US House of Representatives held hearings on the
activities of US multinational corporations. 4 After two and a half
years of congressional hearings, US President Jimmy Carter
signed the Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure
36. See XXISMANN, sup a note 32, at 94 (discussing the SEC's concern over the
extent of corruption); see also Bixby, supra note 17, at 92-93 (noting how the discovery
of illegal colntributLions made by corporate executives to Nixon's reelection campaign
prompted former SEC enforcement chiei, Stanley Sporkin, to conduct an investigation
examining the financial reports of these corporations with the purpose of determining
how the illegal payments were recorded on corporate books).
37. See WEISNLXNN, supra note 32, at 95 (noting the purpose behind the SEC's
report); see also Longobardi, supra note 31, at 433-34 (highlighting the SEC's lormal
investigation).
38. See S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban AfIairs, 95th Cong., Rep. of the SEC
on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices (Comm. Print 1976)
[hereinafter SEC RLPORT]; see also Brown, supra note 32, at 241, 243 (discussing the
impact of the SEC Report); Krever, supra note 30, at 87 (stating that the US Congress
passed the FCPA, in part, as a response to the SEC report).
39. See Brown, supra note 32, at 241, 243 (discussing the results of the report and
subsequent reaction); see also Krever, supra note 30, at 87 (highlighting the results of
the report).
40. See SEC RLPoRT. sup a note 38 (listing the results of the self-disclosure survey);
see also H.R. RP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (stating the results of the report).
41. See SEC REPORT, supra note 38 (listing the results of the SEC self-disclosure
smuvey); see also H.R. RLP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (acknowledging the results of the SEC
Report).
42. See H.R. RLP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (noting the prevalence of corruption in
highly-regarded US companies); see also WEISMANN, supra note 32, at 95 (obsexving the
caliber of companies involved in corruption).
43. See Mike Koehler, The Facade ofFCPA Enforcent. 41 GEO. .. INTL L. 907 912
(2010) (discussing the congressional hearings held in the smrner and fall of 1975).
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Bill ("FCPA") into law on December 20, 1977.44 One reason
behind the creation of the FCPA was to demonstrate the United
States' commitment to the rule of law in international business. 45
Specifically, the FCPA makes it a crime for any issuer of a
class of securities, domestic concern, or person to "make use of
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money"
to a foreign official, non-US political party, or person who may
offer money to a foreign official. 46 The FCPA includes two main
portions: the anti-bribery provisions and the books, records, and
internal control provisions ("accounting" provisions). 47 The
anti-bribery provisions apply to all companies, whether publicly
traded or privately owned. 4 These provisions prohibit US
companies and its personnel from paying, offering to pay,
promising to pay, or authorizing the payment of money, a gift,
or anything of value to a foreign official in order to obtain or
retain business.49 The accounting provisions, on the other hand,
only apply to issuers of securities-in other words, only to
publicly traded companies. 5°1 They require US companies and
their personnel to keep accurate records of transactions
conducted abroad.5' The SEC is responsible for enforcing the
44. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3 (2006). See also Koehler, supra note 43,
at 912 (discussing the hearings leading to President Carter signing the FCPA).
45. See Engle, supra note 24, at 1176 (mentioning the intent behind the creation
of the FCPA); see also Presidential Statement on Signing S. 305 into Law. 2 PUB. PAPERS
2155 (Dec. 20, 1977) ("1 share Congress [sic] belief that bribery is ethically repugnant
and competitively unnecessary ...Recent revelations of widespread overseas bribe,
have eroded public confidence in our basic institutions.").
46. See 15 U.S.C. §278dld-1 (a) (I)-(?)), 78dd-2 (a) (I)-(?)), 78ddI-3(a) ()()
47. See 15 U.S.C. 7dd-l, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 78m(b) (2) (A)-(B); see also Koehler,
supra note 43, at 913, 921-22 (detailing the two main provisions of the F(PA).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1. 78dd-2. 78dd-2 (applying the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions to all issuers, any domestic concern, and any person other than an issuer).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1)(378dd-2(a) (1)(378dd-3(a)(1)-(3).
50. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (applying the FCPA's accounting
provisions only to issuers).
51. See id. (detailing the accounting provisions of the FCPA). The books and
records provisions require issuers to "make and keep books, records, and accounts,
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and lairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer." The internal control provisions require issuers
to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide
2012]
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accounting provisions, and both the SEC and DOJ are
responsible for enforcing violations of the anti-briber-
provisions. 52
In addition to enforcing the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions,
the DOJ oversees a mechanism called the Opinion Procedure
that allows US companies to obtain an advance ruling about
whether a particular course of conduct would violate the
FCPA. 5", The purpose of this mechanism is to assist US
companies in navigating the ambiguities of the FCPA's
provisions.5 4 A US firm obtains this advance ruling by providing
information on an "actual- not a hypothetical- transaction"
based upon "full and true disclosure" of all relevant facts. 55 The
DOJ must issue an opinion within thirty days after the request is
deemed complete.b The advance ruling does not conclude that
a proposed course of conduct violates the law.57 Instead, the
DOJ determines whether certain prospective conduct would
conform to the DOJ's present enforcement policy under the
FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. 58
reasonable assurances" that transactions are recorded according to managemcnt's
authorization for accountability purposes. Id.
52. See Krcver, supra note 30, at 89 (explaining the division of responsibility
among the government enforcement agencies). See see also Brown, sup a note 32, at
258 (mentioning the cnircement agencies' respective re sponsibilities).
53. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 80 (1999); see
also JEFFREY P. BtALOs & GREGORY HUSISLAN, THE FORLIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT:
COPING WiVTH CORRU PTION IN TRANSNATIONAM ECONOMYFS 57 (1997) (discussing the
Opinion Procedure generally).
54. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Opinion Procedure, supra note 53, § 80.1
("These procedures enable issuers and domestic concerns to obtain an opinion of the
Attorney General as to whether certain specified, prospective- not hypothetical-
conduct conlorms with the Department's present enforcement policy regarding the
anti-bribel) provisions.").
55. See id. §§ 80.1, 80.6 (detailing the general requirements that arc necessary to
obtain an SEC opinion regarding a proposed transaction).
56. See id. § 80.8 (stating the general tmncline of an opinion procedure request).
The US Dcpartment of Justice ("DOJ"), however, may extend the thirty-day
requirement if they request additional inlormation. Id.
57. See id. (discussing the response expected of the Attorney General).
58. See id. ("The Attorney General or his designee shall. within 30 (lays after
receiving a request that complies with the foregoing procedure, respond to the request
by issuing an opinion that states whether the prospective conduct, would, tor purposes
of the DOJ's present cnoircemcnt policy, violate 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1 and 78dd-2.").
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One particular area of ambiguity has been the Exception.59
The 1977 version of the FCPA statute included an exception to
the rule against bribing foreign officials. 60 Congress
incorporated this exception in the statute's definition of
"foreign official.'I' The definition indicated that an individual
whose duties were "essentially ministerial or clerical" would not
constitute a "foreign official" for the purposes of this Act.62
Congress viewed this exception as a "necessary evil." t", A
September 28, 1977 House Report contemplated the
Exception's purpose and commented:
While payments made to assure or to speed the proper
performance of a foreign official's duties may be
reprehensible in the United States, the committee
recognizes that they are not necessarily so viewed elsewhere
in the world and that it is not feasible for the United States
to attempt unilaterally to eradicate all such payments.s 4
In spite of congressional reluctance to permit facilitating
payments, both US congressmen and businessmen viewed the
Exception as necessary to maintain a competitive business edge
59. See Bixby, sup a note 17. at 110 (noting how the ambiguity of the Exception
has created problems in determining the amount allowed to be made in the forim of
facilitating payments); see also Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It's Time to
Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INTL & (OMP. L. RrV. 379, 399
(2005) (observing that the Department of Justice has identilied several factors that
increase prosecution but has not provided sufficient clarification to facilitate decision-
making).
60. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, § 30A(a) (3) (b), Pub. I No. 95-213,
91 Stat. 1494 (codified as anended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq (2006)) (demonstrating
Congress's initial steps towards what later became the Exception by showing that the
original unenacted version provided an exception within the term "ioreign oflicial" for
payments to these officials).
61. See id.
62. See id. ("Such term [foreign official] does not include any employee of a
foreign government or any department, agency, or insuumentality thereof whose
duties are essentially ministerial or clerical.").
63. See H.R. R.P. No. 95-640, at 8 (1977) (detailing Congress's views towards
facilitating payments); see also jon Jordan. The OECDs Call for an End to "Corrosive
Facilitation Payrments and the International Focus on the Facilitation Payrments Exceptio I der
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 13 U. PA. .. Bus. L. 881. 891 (2011) (discussing
Congress's concession to business interests when agreeing to permit facilitating
payments).
64. H.R. R P. No. 95-640, at 8 (emphasis added). See also Jordan, supra note 63, at
891 ("This passage clearly indicates Congress's disdain for facilitation payments during
the drafting of the FCPA.").
2012]
1896 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 35:1884
abroad. 65 US businessmen, however, continued to demand
further assistance for US companies while transacting abroad.6
These demands culminated in 1988 when the US Congress
amended the FCPA in an attempt to eliminate ambiguities in
the FCPA's provisionsY7 The amendment delineated a clearer
exception to the rule against bribery payments. Congress
added an explicit "facilitating payments" exception. 0 This
statute provides an exception for "routine governmental action"
and indicates that the prohibition against paying foreign
officials "shall not apply to any facilitating or expediting
payment to a foreign official, political party, or party official the
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of
a routine governmental action by a foreign official." 70 The
statute attempts to clarify the meaning of "routine governmental
65. See Jordan, supra note 63, at 891 ("Congress was concerned during the time of
the drafting of the FCPA in the late seventies that facilitation payments appeared to be
a part of doing business internationally and that unilaterally prohibiting domestic
companics froin making them, on top of the restrictions already imposed by the FPA,
would place them at a competitive disadvantage in the global marketplace."); see also
Earle, supra note 5, at 487 (mentioning how other countries did not have analogous
legislation to the FCPA at the time).
66. See Steven R. Salbu, Bribey in the Global Mrke,: A Critical Analysis of he Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. 54 WASH. & LEE IL REV. 229, 243 (1997) (noting how in the 1980s,
critics began calling for modification tor the FPA); see also Bixby, supra note 17. at 97
(discussing how the 1988 amendment was in response to slumping foreign trade
between the United States and international firms); Earle, supra note 5, at 487 (noting
how the FCPA limitations placed on US companics placed US firms at a competitive
disadvantage).
67. See Earle, supra note 5, at 487 (discussing how bribery and corruption were
economic realities spurring Congress to anend the FCPA in 1988 to make it easier for
companies to comply with the FCPA); Krever, spr#a note 30, at 88 ("The 1988
amendment was largely in response to complaints by U.S. corporations that the original
Act was too vague and wide in scope.").
68. See Krever, spr#a note 30, at 88-89 (explaining how the 1988 amendment
clarified the Exception); see also Bixby, supra note 17, at 97-98 (observing how the
effort to eliminate some obstacles resulting fiom the statute's anbiguity led to the 1988
amendment).
69. Compare Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213,
§ 30A(a) (3) (b), 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1, et seq (2006)),
with 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2((b), 78dd-3(b) (2006) (providing a specific
exception for facilitating payments). See also Krever, sup a note 30, at 89 (noting how
originally, facilitating payments were allowed for duties that were ministerial or clerical,
but that the 1988 amendments permitted lacilitating payments to expedite or secure
periormance of a "routine governmental action").
70. See 15 U.S.(. §§ 78dd-1 (b). 78dd-2(b). 78dd-3(b).
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action" by providing a list of actions that are "ordinarily and
commonly performed by a foreign official."' 1 These actions
include obtaining permits and licenses, processing
governmental papers, providing police protection, phone
service, power and water supply, and "actions of a similar
nature." 72 The statute is clear that "routine governmental
action" does not cover actions that induce foreign official to
award new business or to continue business,73
B. The United States Takes the Lead in Combating International
Corruption
For more than three decades, the United States has been a
global leader in the fight against corruption.74 Following the
passage of the FCPA, Congress became concerned that
American companies were operating at a disadvantage
compared to other countries that permitted the payment of
bribes.75 As a result, in 1988, Congress directed the Executive
Branch to begin negotiations with the OECD to obtain an
agreement with the United States' major trading partners to
enact legislation similar to the FCPA. 7 The thiry member
countries of the OECD signed the OECD Convention in 1997 as
71. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(3) (A) (i)-(v), 78dd-2(4) (A) (i)-(v), 78dd-3(4) (A) (i)-(v)
(listing what may qualify as a "routine governmental action").
72. See id.
73. See id. at §§ 78dd-l (1) (3) (B), 78dd-2(f) (4) (B), 78dd-3(f) (4) (B) (" The term
routine governmental action' does not include any decision by a foreign official
whether, or on what terms, to award new business to or to continue business with a
particular party, or any action tken by a foreign olficial involved in the decision-
making process to encourage a decision to award new business to or continue business
with a particular party.").
74. See KLNNEDY & DANIELSEN, sup a note 22, at 5 (noting US dominance in anti-
corruption efirts); see also Bixby, supa note 17, at 98, 100 (mncntioning the United
States' encouraging in enacting the OECD Convention).
75. See LAY PLRSON'S GUIDE, supra note 16 (expressing Congress's concerns of a
competitive disadvantage). In fact, some countries permitted companies to deduct tihe
cost of bribes as business expenses on their taxes. See id.; see also Earle, supra note 5, at
485-87 (detailing the histors of corruption before the passage of the FCPA).
76. See LAY PELRSON'S (UIDL, supra note 16 (mentioning the purpose behind US
negotiatiolns with the OECD); see also john Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, 93 A.B.A.J.
48, 50 (2007) (discussing how the United States in 1998 persuaded the thirty
industrialized nations belonging to the OECD to sign a treaty agreeing to adopt similar
anti-corruption laws).
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a result of these efforts. 77 In principle, the adoption of the
OECD Convention by signatory nations marked an emergence
of an international commitment to enforcing bribery
prohibitions. 78
Many of these countries modeled their domestic anti-
bribery provisions after the FCPA's provisions, evidence of the
international commitment to enforce anti-bribery measures.7-
Beginning with the OECD Convention, the FCPA became the
model for the global proliferation of national anti-corruption
legislation8 ° In the years since, most countries have adopted
domestic legislation criminalizing corrupt international business
practices. 81 Additionally, a number of multilateral treaties setting
global anti-corruption standards now exist.8 2
77. See Gibeaut, supra note 78, at 50 (mentioning the US joint elfort with the
OECD and the results of these efforts); see also OECD Convention, supra note 18: LAY
PLRSON'S GUIDE, sup a note 16 (noting the reIults of US efforts in working with the
OECD).
78. See Andrew Brady Spalding, nwitting Sanctions.: Understanding Anti-Bribeo
Legislation as Economic Sa rctions Awgit EmgKg M iets, 62 FL _. L. RLV. 351. 353-54
(2010) (observing the rise in international commitment against corruption in business
transactions). Spalding notes, however, that this commitment, while international, is
not universal. See id.; see also Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-
Briber) and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 33 XEEIYCOMp. PRES. DoC. 2290 (Nov. 10,
1998) ("Under the Convention, our Inajor competitors will be obligated to criminalize
the briber) offoircign public officials in international business transactions.").
79. See KENNEDY & I)ANIEISEN, s:pra note 22, at 20 (observing the FCPA's
influence on other nations' anti-bribery statutes); see also Alexandros Zelvos, Amending
the Foreigr Corrupt Practices Act: Repeairg te Exemption for "Routine Goverrimert Act"
Payments, 25 PENN ST. INT'l I. REV. 251, 252 (2006) ("Once a unique national elfort,
the general fiamework of the FCPA is now an imporLtant template fir global anti-
corruption efforts.").
80. See KENNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 22, at 28 (discussing FCPA's
contribution to anti-corruption efforts worldwide); see also Engle, supra note 24. at 1188
(noting US eflorts that enabled the FCPA to become a worldwide model for anti-
corruption statutes).
81. See OR(GANISATION FOR ECoNI. C CO-OPLRATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
INFORNLATION SHLT ON THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY oF FOREIGN
PUBLIC OFFICIAIS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 8, available at
http://ww.oecd.org/dataoccd/52/24/2406452.pdf (listing the countries Lhat have
implemented legislation criminalizing corrupt international business practices
including Argentina, Austria, and Portugal); KLNNLDY & DANIELSEN, sup a note 22, at 5
(mentioning the globalization of anti-corruption standards); see also Zervos. supra note
79, at 252 (discussing the prolileration of the FCPA's policies).
82. See, e.g., United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41; Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 173;
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Vhile an international commitment against corruption
exists, this commitment has not always been supported by
effective enforcement measures, even in the United States.8 ,
Initially, the DOJ effectively ignored the FCPA as an
enforcement tool.s4 Over the last decade, however, the United
States has increased its enforcement activity. 5 -In fact, FCPA
enforcement has risen substantially>86 Between 2004 and 2009,
the United States commenced 143 enforcement actions against
companies and individuals,8 The DOJ also levied substantial
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-
39, 35 I.L.M. 724: see also KNNLD & DANIELSEN, supra note 22, at 5 ("In the years
since, largely at the behest of the United States, dozens of leading trading partners
have adopted domestic legislation criminalizing corrupt toreign business practices in
contormity wi/ih a number of multilateral treaties setting global anti-corruption
standards."). See generall Course Material, Cecil Hunt, Recent Metatr asurs to
Combat Corruption, ALI-ABA Going Int'l: Fundamentals of int'l Bus. Transactions
(Dec. 7-9, 2006) 1-2, available at http://ww.wiltshiiregrannis.com/siteFiles/News/
91 D7464( ( 06AB0 I (I 29A5B50l972 D8.pdf (listing key international anti-corruption
agreements).
83. See Carrington, supra note 4, at 130 ("Laws made in the last decade to address
this longstanding global problem [of transnational corrupt practices] have not been
etfecctively enforced."); see also Bixby, supra note 17, at 103 (noting that during the first
quarter century FCPA enforcement was "minimal, at best").
84. See M. Scott Peeler & J. Carson Pulley, Irternationalizing the FCPA: Ending the
Fa ilitation Payments Exception and U.S. Anti-Corruption H)lpocisY 4, INTERNATIONA
BRIBLRY: FCPA Update 2011 (on file with author) (observing the United States' recent
enforcement actions, while comparing the previous lack of enlorcement); see also
lever, sup a note 30, at 93 (discussing the limited impact of the FCPA as a result of the
lack of initial enforcement).
85. See KLNNEDY & DANILLSLN, sup a note 22. at 10 (noting what the authors deein
the "third phase" of the United States' light against corruption: careful enforcement);
see also John K Carroll & Lisa K. Marino, The Incredible Shrinking FCPA Facilitation
Paymient Exception, 241 N.Y. LJ. S6 (2009) ("In the last fcw years, the number of
investigations opened by thcse t wo agencies has increased firom a handful to several
dozen a year.").
86. Se Examinirg Enforement of the Foreigr Corrupt Practes Act: Hearing Be/ore the
Subcomm. on Crirne and Drugs of the Comm. on the Judieiarn, l1th Cong. 77-86 (2010)
(statement of Andrew Weissmnann, Partner, Jenner & Block LLP) [hereinafter
Eniorcement Hearing] ("While there were only three open FCIPA investigations in
2002, there were one hundred and wenty such investigations pending at the end of
2009-a fory-fold increase."); see also Russell Gold & David Crawford, U S., Other
Aations Step L Bribet3 BattIe: Prosecutions Climb on Tougher Laws Aimed at Businesses,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 12. 2008, at B-1 (noting the dramatic increase in US enforcement
actions, in line with growing international cooperation in curbing corruption).
87. See Peeler & Pulley, sapra note 84, at 3 (detailing the number of US
enforcement actions against companies and individuals). Additionally, the DOJ is
investigating over 140 companies and individuals for potential FCPA violations as of
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fines against companies.88 For example, it ordered Siemens AG
to pay US$450 million for FCPA 6olations." More recently, in
the FBI-led African Sting Case investigating corruption in
Gabon, fifty-eight companies paid US$3.74 billion in settlements
to the US government. 9 This dramatic increase in FCPA
penalties and settlements demonstrates the United States'
continuing commitment to curb corruption. 91 The DOJ has even
prosecuted individuals for violations of the FCPA anti-bribery
provisions. 92 In the DOJ's prosecution of Siemens AG, six former
executives were charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA,
2011. See id.: see also 2010 Y-eaI iFCPA Update, GiBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2011), available
at http://www.g-bd.so r ' cor/publication./pages/2O1O7ea ErdFCPA jpdate.a.px
[hereinafter GIBSON DUNN] (depicting a graph demonstrating the increase horm 2004
to 2009 and observing that the level of enforcement activity has been rising steadily
over the past seven years with a recent substantial increase in 2010, marking an eightv-
five percent increase in enforcement actions over 2009.)
88. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't. of Just., Siemens AG and Three Subsidiaries
Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and Agree to Pay $450 million
in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), available at htLp: // w.usdoj.gov/opa/
pr/2008/Decemberi08-crm-l 105.html [hereinalter D). Press Release] (discussing the
penalties levied against Siemens AG); see also Bixby, supra note 17, at 109, 129-40
(referring to data from cases in Tables 6 through 8 in his article to declare that the
total amount of fines, lees, penalties, and disgorged profits of FCPA enlorcement
actions totals US$2,421,681,799 between 2002 and 2010, and clarifying that these tables
do not represent a complete list of FCPA prosecutions since 2002).
89. See DOJ Press Release, sopra note 88 (noting the penalties against Siemens
AG); see also Leslie Wayne, Bribery Case Falls Apart, and Tactics Are Doubted. N.Y. TIMF'S,
Feb. 23, 2012, at BI (noting scttlements paid to the United States from the African
Sting Case investigation).
90. SeeWayne, sup note 89 (listing the anounts paid by fifty-eight companies).
91. See Krever, supra note 30, at 94 ("Entorcement actions by domestic agencies
appear to be on the increase and the prosecutions undertaken in the last few years
suggest that the SEC and DOJ are becoming serious about tackling overseas bribex-");
see also Justin F. Marceau, A Litle Less CoA eat,, Littl More Aeo: Lcalmeig and
Foecsting The rend of Wor Fequent ar d Suer P -cution Under The F-egn Corpt
Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM . CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 287 (2007) (" [T]he Department of
Justice has demonstratcd, both through prosecutions and public statcments, a
commitment to aggressively prosecute corporate bribery.").
92. See Joe Palazzolo, Ex-Siemens Execs Charges with Bribery in Latest FCPA
Blockbuster. WALL ST.J. L. BLOG, (Dec. 13, 2011, 11:44 AM), http://blogs.wsj.coi/law/
201 1/12/13/ex-siemens-execs-charged-with-briber-in-latest-fcpa-blockibuster/
[hereinafter Palazzolo, FCPA Blockbuster] (discussing the DO.'s announceincnt that six
former executives of Siemens and two alleged intermediaries have now been charged
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA in light of criticism for failing to charge individuals
in the "headline cases"): see also Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 4 (mentioning a
corporate officer's sentence of eighty-seven months with no possibility of parole).
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and in the African Sting Case, twenty-two business executives
were arrested. " Notably, however, Federal District Judge
Richard J. Leon for the District of Columbia granted the DQJ's
motion to dismiss the indictments against the defendants in the
African Sting trial, a significant setback for FCPA enforcement. 94
These statistics are significant because they highlight the
DOJ's resolve to fight corruption aggressively. 95 The SEC and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") have also devoted
substantial resources to FCPA enforcement.90
C. The International Stance Toward Legal Bribes
The Exception is a unique feature of the FCPA, since only
four other countries in the world permit the use of facilitating
payments. 7 These four nations are Australia, Canada, New
93. See Wayne, supa note 89 (mentioning the charges levied against the business
executives).
94. See Wayne, supra note 89 (highlighting how the Afican Sting Case fell apart
and drew Judge Leon's ire at the DOJ's tactics in prosecuting and investigating cases
for violations of the FCPA); see also Africa Singln the Words of Judge Leon,
1CPAPRoFESSOR.COM, (Feb. 23, 2012), http://wwi.cpaprofessor.com/africa-sting-in-
the-words-of judge-leon (providing Judge Leon's statement criticizing the DOJ's
tactics).
95. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 4: see also Joe Palazzolo, Does the Might
,
FCPA Need Reining In?. WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2011. 9:42 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.comilai2011/ 11 i28/does-the-mighty-cpa-need-reining-in
[hereinafter Palazzolo, Mighty FCPA] (citing Lanny Breuer, head of the 'DO's
Criminal Division, "This is precisely the wrong moment in histol) to weaken the FCPA
.... There is no argument for becoming more permissive when it cones to
corruption.").
96. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 4 ("The Justice Departnent and SEC,
along with the FBI, have continued to devote more and more resources along with the
FBI, to FCPA enforcement."); see also Claudius 0. Sokenu, FCPA Enforcement after U nited
States v. Kay: SEC and DOJ Team Up to Increase Consequences of FCPA Violation, 1619
PIIiCorp. 189, 23-24 (2007) (noting generally the increased cooperation between the
SEC and DOJ in enforcing the FCPA). The Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") is a
national securiy and law entorcement organization that protects the United States
from terrorist threats and enlorces US criminal laws. See THE FBI: FLDELRKL BUREAU OF
INVESTI(ATION, ht):/ /ww.tbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
97. See Jordan, supra note 63. at 888-89 (noting this unique feature of the FC PA);
see also Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 5 (observ ing that other nations' anti-briberv
statutes have "evolved and matured" since they do not feature a facilitating payment
exception).
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Zealand, and South Korea.98 Australia is currently reviewing its
use of facilitating payments. 9 By maintaining the Exception, the
United States does not adhere to current international
standards as evidenced by recent OECD actions and the Bribery
Act. 100
The OECD Convention permits "small" facilitation
payments, but the OECD now takes a strong stance against
facilitating payments.""1 The OECD Convention established a
monitoring system carried out by the OECD Working Group on
Bribery to ensure the thorough implementation of the
international obligations taken on under the Convention. 10 2 In
98. See Criminal Code Anendment (Bribety of Foreign Public OJficiais) Act 1999 div 70.4
(AusL.): Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, S.C. 1998, c. 34(4)-(5) (Can.);
Section 105C (3) of the Crimes Act 196 1, as inserted by section 8 of the Crimes (Bribers
of Foreign Public Oticials) Anendnent Act 2001 (N.Z.); Act on Preventing Briber) of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Act. No. 5588, Dec. 28.
1998, art. 3(2) (S. Kor.), translated in I STATUTES OF THE REPUBLIC OF KORLA 9 (Korea
Legislation Research Inst. 2012); see also Peeler & Pulley, sopra note 84, at 5 (listing
these four countries as the only other nations outside thre United States that permit
facilitating payments).
99. See Public Consultation Paper, Assessing the "Facilitation Payments" Defence to the
Foreign Briber Offence and Other Measures. Australian Government: Attorney-Gencral's
Department, 1 (2011) [hereinafter Consultation Paper] (discussing how the Australian
government is currently reviewing the treatment of facilitation payments under
Australian law).
100. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at I ("The facilitation payments exception
no longer has any reasonable justification in the modern global anti-corruption
climate."); see also Preparing for the End of Facilitation Payrments, FCPA ( OMPLLANCE &
ETHICs BLOG (Sept. 15, 2011. 6:50 AM), http://www.ffoxlaw.wordpress.com/2011/09/
15/preparing-for-the-end-of-facilitation-payments (noting Richard Alderman's belief
that corporations that do not yet have a zero tolerance approach to facilitating
payments will begin to commit themselves to this approach and work to eliminate these
payments as a result of the Bribe) Act). Richard Alderman is thre Director of the UK
Serious Fraud Otice ("SFO"). The SFO is an independent government department
that investigates fraud and corruption in England, Northern Ireland, and Wales. See
14Vho We Are. SERIoUS FRAU ) OFF., http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/wvho-we-are.aspx
(last visited Dec. 28, 2011) (detailing the SFO's responsibilities).
101. See OECD Convention, supra note 18, at 15, n.9. ("Sia1 'lacilitation'
payments do not constitute payments made 'to obtain or retain business or other
improper advantage' within the meaning of paragraph 1 and, accordingly, are also not
an offence."). The rest of Commentary 9, however, criticizes iacilitation payments as a
corrosive phenomenon." Id. See OECD Recommendation, supra note 20 (discouraging
the use of all facilitating payments); see also Jordan, supra note 63. at 900-01 (reviewing
OECD Phase I and 2 Reports criticizing the Exception).
102. See OECD Convention, sup a note 18 (detailing the monitoring system to
assist the implementation process).
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monitoring the United States' implementing legislation of the
OECD Convention and its effectiveness, the OECD issued a
report in three phases criticizing the use of the Exception.',",
The Phase 1 Report, reviewing the legislation implementing the
OECD Convention in the United States, expressed the OECD's
concern over the FCPA's definition of "routine governmental
action."' 10 4 While the FCPA definition contained a list of specific
payments that are permitted, the OECD noted that the list was
"not sufficiently qualified" and should reference the size of the
payment and the discretionary nature of the act.105
Phase 2 of the OECD Report assessed the effectiveness of
the legislation's application in the US and again criticized the
Exception, finding issue with its wording.10i1 The report noted
that the statute's language does not limit the Exception to
"small" facilitation payments, does not apply to the US domestic
bribery statute, and does not apply outside the "purpose" of the
payment. 17 In its 2009 Recommendation for Further Combating
Bribery of Foreign Officials, the OECD urged all signatory
nations to end the use of "corrosive" facilitation payments.o s
The OECD's decision to prohibit facilitation payments
continues the evolution of what Transparency International has
called the "diminishing tolerance for facilitation payments.''10 9
103. See generally, United States: Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997
Reconmendations, OECD) (Apr. 1999), http:/iww .oecd.orgi dataoecd/ I /50/
2390377.pdf [hereinaiter OECD Phase 1 Report]: Lited States. Phase 2 Rport on
Appic ation oj the Convention on Combating Bribey ofForeign Pubi OJficia in Jntertioral
Bsiness Transactions and the 1997 Recommendation on Combating ribe, in International
Business Transaetions,OECD (Oct.2002), http: / /www.ocd.org/ dataoecd/ 2/ 19/
1962084.pdf [hereinafter OECI) Phase 2 Report]; see alsojordan, supra note 63, at 900-
01 (discussing the OECD Phase 1 and 2 Reports of the United States' application of the
OECD Convention and the OECD's criticisns toward the Exception).
104. OECD Phase I Report, sopra note 103, at 22 (discussing the issue that
specific payments can be excepted from the FCPA's prohibitions).
105. OECD Phase 1 Report, supra note 103, at 22 (offering recommendations to
solve this possible exception to the FCPA's prohibition of bribers payments).
106. See OECD Phase 2 Report, supra note 103, at 34 (criticizing the language of
the statute).
107. Id. (providing further criticism of the FCPA's provisions).
108. OECD Recommendation, supra note 20 (urging all nations to prohibit
inducements such as facilitation payments).
109. Cheryl A. Krause & Elisa T. Wiygul, FCPA Comp/i,re: The Varshing
"Facilitating Payments" Exception?. 2 FIN. FRAUD L. RLP. 730, 732. Transparency
International is a global organization that created a network of nore than nincty
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The OECD's recent actions, along with other international calls
for ending facilitation payments, have put the United States
under strong international pressure to change its policies. 1 0
The Bribery Act places even stronger international pressure
on the United States. I I I The UK Parliament enacted a new
comprehensive statute to replace the formerly fragmented and
complex common law bribery offenses previously employed to
combat bribery. 112 The United Kingdom's Bribery Bill received
Royal Assent on April 8, 2010, thus becoming the Bribery Act of
2010.111 The Bribery Act entered into force on July 1, 2011.L" 4
Notably, the Bribery Act has greater extraterritorial reach.' 5
The FCPA's jurisdiction covers acts of non-US individuals and
entities, relying on the territorial principle of jurisdiction. 1 6 Its
jurisdiction also encompasses acts of US persons abroad, relying
on the nationality principle that provides for jurisdiction over
locally established chapters to fight domnestic corruption. See About Us. TRANSPARENCY
INT'I, http:i//ww.transparency.org/about-us (last visited )ec. 28, 2011) (describing
the organization's goals to fight corruption on the ground, as well as through global
and regional initiatives).
110. See Jordan, supra note 63, at 882-83 (discussing the recent OECD actions
along with other international non-governmental calls for ending facilitation
payments); see also Peeler & pulley, supra note 84, at 6 (noting that commentators have
emuphasized that the main problem with the facilitation payments exception is that it is
no longer consistent with anti-corruption laws in almost every other nation).
I11. See Dunst et al., supra note 24, at 274 (warning that US companies, in
allowing facilitating payments, or in not prohibiting thcm, may undermine efforts to
establish an aftirmative detnse under the Briber) Act); see also Engle, supra note 24, at
1188 (discussing how the Bribery Act has raised international standards).
112 See Acts: Bribecv Act 2010. U.K. MINISTRY OF JUST.,
http://wN.jutice.gov.uk/legislation/bills-and-acts/acLs/bribe-y-acL-2010 (last visited
Dec. 29, 2011) (describing the background and purpose of the UK Bribers Act).
113. Bribery Act, 2010. c. 23 (U.K.), available at http://wN.opsi.goV.uk/
acts20l0/pdtukpga-20100023_en.pdfI
114. See Acts: Bribery Act 2010, supra note 112 ("It wvas also announced that the Act
will cone into force on 1 July 2011.").
115. Compare Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 12(5) (U.K.), with F(PA, 15 U.S.C. §§
78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-388 (2006).
116. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd- (g) ("It shall also be unlawful tor any issuer organized
under the laws of the United States, or a State, territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States ... or fbr any United States person."); see also Brown, supra note
32, at 300-02 (describing the bases of jurisdiction for the FCPA's extraterritorial
reach).
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US citizens even while they are abroad.11 The Bribery Act, in
comparison, has broader extraterritorial reach because it
reaches companies that do business with a UK citizen or
company." IS Section 7 of the Bribery Act, in particular, may have
serious implications for multinational corporations doing
business with the United Kingdom.'119 This Section makes it a
criminal offense for a commercial organization to fail to prevent
bribery. 120 The statute defines "commercial organisation"
broadly and, therefore, reaches virtually all major multinational
corporations. 121
Further, the Bribery Act is silent as to whether it prohibits
facilitation payments. 122 In September 2010, the UK Ministry of
Justice published a consulting paper that provided some
guidance as to the Act's stance on facilitation payments. 23 The
UK Ministry of Justice noted that the OECD recognizes the
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(i) ("It shall also be unlawful for any United States
person .... "); see also Brown, spr#a note 32, at 300-02 (detailing the bases of
jurisdiction under the FCPA).
118. See Bribers Act, 2010, § 12 (U.K.); see also Enforcement Hearing, supra note
87, at 23 (noting that, in England, the Bribel- Act encompasses persons without a
principle place of business); see also Warin. supra note 25, at 28 (observing how the
Bribery Act, under section 7, in many ways exceeds the aggressive jurisdictional claims
of the FCPA).
119. See Bribery Act, 2010 § 7 (U.k); see also Warin et al., supra note 25, at 15 ("In
practice, however, section 7's far more liberal jurisdictional requirements for a
business's tailure to prevent bribery could have a profound impact on multinational
corporations.").
120. See Bribery Act, 2010, § 7 (U.K.) (making it an olfense for a commercial
organization to tail to prevent bribery).
121. See id. (including partnerships and corporate bodies that can on a business,
or are part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom in the definition of
"relevant commercial organisatin"); see also Warin et al., supra note 25, at 28 ("The
inclusion of tihe second and fourth groups as 'relevant commercial organisaionsI
seemingly sweeps into the Bribers Act's ambit virtually all major multinational
corporations-the vast majority of which conduct some business in the United
Kingdom.").
122. See Bribers Act, 2010, § 7, (U.K.) (refraining from providing an exception to
bribe payments).
123. See U.K- MINISTRY OF JUST.. (ONSULTATION ON GUIDANCE ABOUT
(OMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS PREVENTING BRIBERY (SECTION 9 OF THE BRIBERY ACT
2010), 2010. (Pll10,. at 22-23 (U.K), available at
h ttp://ww. Juts Lice.gov. uk/downloads/ consul ation s/bribery-act-guidance-
consultationl.pdf [hereinalter UK CONSULTATION] (detailing the UK view on
facilitating payments); see also Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84. at 5 (noting thre
significance of the consulting paper).
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corrosive effects of facilitation payments and indicated that this
form of payment is likely to trigger an offense under the Bribery
Act.124 The Ministry further explained that exemptions create
"artificial distinctions" that are ultimately difficult to enforce
and may be abused' 25 In October 2010, the director of the
United Kingdom's Serious Fraud Office, Richard Alderman,
indicated that a "safe harbor" such as facilitation payments is
concerning because its boundaries will be tested. 126 Practitioners
have also noted that with the passage of the Bribery Act, the
trend toward zero tolerance of facilitation payments will
continue. 127
11. TWO APPROACHES TO AMENDIN,G THE FCPA
Many commentators advocate a change to the FCPA and
point to the recent trend in enacting more aggressive anti-
corruption statutes.' 28 Others claim that the FCPA harms US
business interests, and they instead advocate for amendments
that would render the statute more "business friendly."129 Part 11
124. UK(ONSULTATION. supra note 123, at 23.
125. UK CONSULTATION. sPra note 123, at 23.
126. Christopher M. Mathews, SF0 Director: No 'Sqf Harbor' Under Vw (.K. Bribe"
Law. MAINJUSTICE.COM (Oct. 20. 2010, 12:58 PM), lttp:'//, ,.mainjustice.com/
justanticorruption 2010/ 10 /20/ so-director-no-safe-harbor-under-new-u- k-bribery-lawv
("Ist not long befoire the boundaries of the safe harbor are starting to be tested.").
127. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 6 (noting how with the passage of the
Bribery Act, the zero tolerance trend toward lacilitation payments will likely escalate);
see also KENNEDY & )ANIELSEN, svupra note 22, at I I (obseving the significance of
several recent national statutes, including those in the United Kingdom and Italy,
which go beyond what the FCPA requires and hold businesses to stricter standards).
128. See generallY.Jordan, supra note 63 (describing the international and domestic
disdain toward tacilitation payments with particular reference to the OECD's stance);
Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 2-3 (noting the current international trend against
facilitation payments and specifically referencing the Bribe) Act in this discussion).
The DOJ. on the other hand, argues that the statute should remain the same. See Joe
Palazzolo, Vw FCPA Guidance... Comin Right (,P. X\ALL ST. J. L. BLOC (Nov. 8, 2011,
4:44 PM), http: //blogs.wsj.com/law/ 2011/11/ 08/ncw-fcpa-guidance-coming-righl -up
[hereinafter Palazzolo, FCPA Guidance] (noting US Assistant Attorney General Lanny
Breuer's emphasis on the need to maintain a strong FCPA by preventing any
amendmients that would make the FCPA nore permissive).
129. See NEISSMANN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 5-7 (noting the FCPA's impact on
business and proposing several amendments to the FCPA); see also GeorgeJ. Terwilliger
111, Can the FCPA be Good for Business?. WHITE & CASE 1 (Sept. 2011),
http://ww.whitecase.com/alerts-09012011/ (follow "Download PDF" hyperlink)
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details the two movements for change to the FCPA: one
advocating for a more aggressive statute and the other
advocating for a more "business friendly" FCPA. Part IL.A
describes the arguments in favor of removing the facilitating
payments exception in order to adhere to recent international
norms in favor of rendering the statute more aggressive. This
Part emphasizes the lack of clarity regarding the Exception's
scope, the criticism of hypocrisy leveled against the United
States, and how this hypocrisy may lead to a culture of
corruption in US companies. Part I1.B discusses the arguments
to amend the FCPA to make it more "business friendly". 1 0 This
Part details the position that the FCPA harms US business
interests, especially in emerging markets and how eliminating
the Exception would not fix the problems associated with the
FCPA.
A. Creating a More Aggressive Statute
Many commentators argue that the Exception should be
eliminated to clarify what is and is not a violation of the FCPA's
anti-bribery provision. 14* An OECD working group received
commentary from private sector representatives on the OECD's
("[O]n the horizon is an initiative to relorm the FCPA and to advocate for
enforcement policies that, by serving the statutc's findamental objectives, would
render the F(TA lar more business-friendly than is now the case.").
130. See Terwilliger, supra note 129, at 1 (noting the argument that the FCPA
provisions need to be examined to determine whether their purposes are worthwhile,
especially if they only serve as impediments to a recovering economy); see also Zervos,
supra notc 79, at 259 (mentioning the view of some c ommentators' that the FCPA does
little to curb corruption, but, radrer, does much to harn business interests).
131. See Koch, supra note 59, at 399 (noting how the I)OJ has lailed to provide aly
firther clarification to tacilitate decision making by US businesses); Palazzolo, Aighty
FCPA, supra note 95(comnnting that companies do not know how to comply with the
law because they do not know where the line between a legitimate business expense
and a bribe falls); Salbu, ,u],'a note 66, at 259 (indicating that in spite of Congress'
attcmpt to clari4 tht Exception through the 1988 amendment, some companies have
barred all lacilitating payments because of continuing concerns about statutory
vagueness); see also Mike Koehler, House Hearing Overview and Observations. FCPA
PRoLSSOR (June 14, 2011), http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.coi/2011/06/house-
hearing -over-iew-and-observations.html [hereinafter House Hearing] (noting
Congressman Louie Gohmtit's obselvation that those subject to the FCIPA should have
clear instructions as to what is or is not a bribe).
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study of anti-corruption measures abroad. 132 These
representatives alnost unanimously called for further guidance
concerning the scope of the Exception.I3  The statute's broad
and uncertain scope creates significant liability risks for US
companies doing business abroad.' 34 Notably, the value of what
is paid is not necessarily determinative.' 35 Unlike the OECD
Convention, the FCPA does not limit the Exception to "small"
payments.i The FCPA does not indicate whether a facilitating
payment is required to be below a certain dollar amount.13 7
132. United Sates: Phase 3 Report on the Application, of the Corvertion, on Conbatin,"
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 1nternational Busiess Transactions and the 2009 Revised
Reconm erdatior on, Conbaitirg Bribey in I tern,,tional Business Trar sacions,
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION ANT) I)E ELOPMENT (Oct. 2010),
http://wN.oecd.org/dataoccd/10/(49/46213841.pdf [hereinafter OECD PHASE 3
REPORT]. These representatives included government experts from Argentina, the
United Kingdom, and the OECD Secretariat, who were tasked with evaluating and
making recommendations on implementation by the United States and enfircement of
the OECD Convention. See id. at para. 6; see Peeler & Pulley, sopra note 84, at 5
(discussing the recommnendations of the private sector representatives).
133. OECD PHASE 3 REPORT, supra note 132 at para. 76 ("Representatives from all
the business sectors involved in the panel discussions at the on-site visit were of the
opinion that the scope of the exception for facilitation payments is unclear, particularly
what kinds of decision-imaking are discretionary and non-discretiona) .") The Phase 3
Report recalled the OECD's Phase 2 Report recommending specific guidance as to the
application of the Exception. The United States published the "Lay Person's Guide to
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act" in lieu of formal guidelines. The Report criticizes
the Lay Person's Guide as essentially a reproduction of the text of the Exception. See id.
at paras. 72-73.
134. See BIALOS & HUSISLAN, supra note 53. at 26 (commenting on thc liability
risks); see also Richard W. (rime & Sara S. Zdeb, The Jllusot
" 
Faiitatir g Payments
Exception Risks Posed by OngoingFCPA Enforcenent Actions and the UK. Briber
, 
Act, SEC. .
PRAC. (,ENTER (May 10. 2011). http://seclawcentcr.pli.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05i(;rime-Risks-osed-byO)ngoing-FCPA.pdf ("[N]or does the
statute provide any additional guidance about where a facilitating payment ends and a
corrupt payment begins.").
135. See STLA.T H. DEMING, INTERNATIONAL PRACTITIONER'S DESKBOOK SERIES:
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANT) THE NEW INTERNATIONMA NORMS 23-24
(2d ed. 2010) (emphasizing the need for caution in using facilitating payments because
of the difficulty in determining what constitutes such a payment and because these
payments are seldom permitted by the written law of a host countr)); see also Koch,
supra note 59, at 399 ("Although the size of the payment or transaction is an escalating
factor, the [L)j's 1979] statement fails to provide any further clarification to facilitate
decision-imaking by US businesses.").
136. Compare FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2006), with
OECD Convention, spra note 18, at 15 (permitting only small payments).
137. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l (b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b) (2006); see also DEMING,
supra note 139, at 23 ("'Tpicall
,
expediting payments are de mi i-is in terms of value.
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Consequently, the dividing line between illegal bribes and
facilitation payments is unclear.","
Judicial scrutiny is "virtually non-existent" because most
FCPA enforcement actions result in a settlement.'1 "As a result,
there is an absence ofjudicial opinions interpreting the scope of
the Exception further preventing necessary clarification of the
the Exception's application. 140 Practitioners and scholars
observe how the absence of judicial scrutiny on FCPA
enforcement actions forces US companies to view settlement
negotiations as case law. 141
In light of these concerns, the DOJ provides the Opinion
Procedure mechanism as a tool in ascertaining whether
proposed conduct would violate the FCPA's anti-bribery
provisions. 142 Commentators, however, have identified
disadvantages to this mechanism including time constraints and
In theor), a large amount of money could still be determined to be an expending
payment."); (;rime & Zdeb, supra note 134, at 2 (noting the lack of clarity regarding
the Exception's outer limits with reference to the lack of guidance regarding a
proscribed amount).
138. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 (a) (3)-(b), 78dd-2(a) (4)-(b), 78dd-3(a) (4)-(b). While
the FCPA enumerates examples of what constltutes a tacilitating paymentn, this list is
non-exhaustive as evidenced by the "catch-all" provision, "actions of a similar nature."
Id. § 78dd-1 (f) (3) (A) (v); see also Jordan, supra note 63, at 887 ("[W]hat colstitutes
Iactions of a similar nature' beyond the specific definition of the exception itself is
uncertain.").
139. See Koehlcr, supra note 43, at 909 (observing that most enfircement actions
result in DOJ non-prosecution agreements, deftrrtd prosecution agreements, pleas, or
SEC settlements rather than case law); see also Koch, supa note 60, at 399 (noting the
scant body" of case law).
140. See WEISMANN, sup a note 32, at 96-97 (discussing how the dividing line
between bribe payments and facilitating payments remains "somewhat unclear"
because of an absence of case law stemming fiom the prior non-existent enforcemtnt
of the FCPA); see also Grime & Zdcb. supra note 134, at 2 ("Federal courts have not
squarely confronted the issue .... To the contrary, only a small handful of decisions
even mention the facilitating payments exception,. and those that do provide little
clarity about the exception's outer limits.").
141. See Koehler, supra note 43, at 910 ("[Enforcement agencies] urge those
suject to the FCPA to view these privately-negotiated agreements as de facto case law
and to confirm conduct to the[se] foggy legal signposts."); see also Marccau, supa note
91, at 287 (criticizing how the unwillingness of corporate defendants to challenge the
DOJ in court has left prosecutors with an almost unchecked authorit to define the
scope of FCPA liabilit,).
142. See BLALOS & HUS1SLAN, supra note 53, at 57 (discussing the effectiveness of
the Opinion Procedure mechanism); see also Koch, sup a note 59, at 399-400 (detailing
the role of the DOJ in writing opinion procedures for proposed conduct).
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inherent risks associated with employing this mechanism. 1 43
Companies entering into negotiations or transactions are usually
under varying deadlines that cannot wait until the DOJ issues a
favorable ruling. 144 Moreover, employing the mechanism
exposes a company to risk.145 The DOJ rulings are not binding
on other federal agencies, thus exposing a company to further
liability. 14t The Opinion Procedure mechanism is infrequently
used by US companies because of these disadvantages.1 47
The lack of clarity regarding the Exception's scope has led
to excessive compliance by US companies. 148 US Congressman
Louie Gohmert of Texas, in the 2010 Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act congressional hearing, observed that the FCPA allows for a
young prosecutor" or an "FBI agent seeking to make a name
143. See Robert W. Tarun, Conducting a Foreign Corrupt P_ ,ices Ac Jnterncl
lnvestigation,[in THE ANNUAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE ON THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICLS ACT B-1, B-8 (2008) (discussing the disadvantages of using the Opinion
Procedure due to the nature of international business transactions) ;see also Salbu, supra
note 66, at 263-64 (noting potential significant limitations of tie review process and
that few US businesses perceive the review procedures as a valuable tool for assessing
the ambiguities of the FCPA).
144. See Tarun, supra note 143, at B-8 (noting that other governments va)
considerably in the manner and timing of olfering investment opportunities resulting
in multinational companies rushing to ineet deadlines due to the uncertainty of the
process): see also Salbu, supra note 66, at 263 (detailing other disadvantages of using tie
Opinion Procedure such as nonbinding nature of )0j review letters and the DOJ's
refusal to grant review letters precedential effect).
145. See BIALOS & HUSISLAN, supra note 53, at 58-59 (listing the array of benefits,
costs and risks associating with filing an opinion request); see also Koch, supra note 59,
at 400 (mentioning the anbiguities in the review procedure and drawbacks associated
with its use).
146. See BJALOS & HUSISLAN, supra note 53, at 58 (obselving that while tie SEC has
stipulated that the agency will not prosecute firns who obtained favorable advance
rulings, a company can still face liability under US doestic law and other federal
agencies); see also Salbu, supra note 66, at 263 (mentioning the )Oj's refusal to grant
review letters with precedential effect).
147. See BLALOS & HUSISIAN, supra note 53, at 58 (noting the infrequent use of the
Opinion Procedure); see also Koch, supra note 59, at 400 ("However, due to the
arnbiguitics in the review procedure and drawbacks associated with its use, businesses
infrequently rely upon this source."); Salbu, suPra note 66. at 263-64 (mentioning that
US businesses do not view the procedure as useful).
148. See Koehler, supra note 43, at 907 (emphasizing how the lack of judicial
scrutiny over the FCPA's provisions breeds inetticient over-compliance); see also Charles
B. Weinograd, Clarijig Grease: Vitigating ,he Threat oj Overdeterrence by De,,ing he Scope
of the Routine Gover eItal Action Lxception, 50 VA. J. INTIL L. 509, 527 (2010) ("One
dramatic consc(luence of statutor C(luivocation is over-deterrence.").
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for himselF' the opportunity to pursue "all sorts" of
enforcement actions. 14  The statute's ambiguity, coupled with
the DOJ's increased FCPA enforcement, has increased concerns
in US companies of unintentionally violating the FCPA leading
to inefficient and costly compliance programs. 150 These
compliance measures are ineffective because companies do not
know how to comply with the law 151 Additionally, a US
multinational firm cannot adequately protect itself from liability
with only a general policy against bribery.152 Instead, a company
must have an effective compliance program against bribery or
risk liability for negligence or condoning illegal activity. 153
US companies also employ law firms to provide companies
with compliance programs, further compounding the costs of
adhering to the FCPA.154 When a corporation is caught in a
government investigation, the legal fees can quickly exceed
149. See House Hearing. supra note 131 (noting Congressman Gohmncrt's
observation of a consequence resulting from the FCPA's ambiguities); see also Dan
Frooinkin, US Chamber of Commerce Battles Anti-Briben Statute, HUTFINGTON POST (Aug.
12, 2011, 9:00 AM), http:iiww. huffingtonpost. com 2011 08 /12 cham be o-
comiitrce-forcign-corrupt-practiccs-act n 919617.htnil (discussing the relationship
between unaccountable prosecutors and bcleaguered corporations).
150. See generally Koehler, sopra note 44 (noting how the current FCPA
enforcement regime leads to inefficient ovcr-comipliancc); see also House Hearng. supra
note 131 (highlighting Congressman Gohmert's criticism that Congress should define
bribery so that companies "can have a clear line" and not have to spend US$200,000 to
figure out whether a payment violates the FCPA); Gibcaut, supra note 77, at 52
(discussing how Lockheed Martin Corporation expends "considerable time and
money" maintaining an eflective compliance program).
151. Palazzolo, FCPA Guidance. sup note 128.
152. See Danforth Newcomb & Philip Urosky, Eyes on Your Bribe, 74 EURO. LAW.
48, 50 (2008) (remarking that general prohibitions against bribery need to be
supported by effective procedueis and controls); see also Erin Reilly Lewis, Trainingfor
Avoidance of Potential Future Cr -aal L-ablt Is. i PUNISHING (ORPORATE (RIME: LEGAL
PENALTIES FOR CRIMINAL AND REGULATORYX OLATIONS 91. 92 (2009) ("The best way
to avoid being scrutinized by a earn of hostile federal agents is to operate ethically
,above suspicion.').
153. See Newcomb & Urofsky, sopra note 152, at 50 (stating that a weak
compliance program has been described as an "invitation to prose cution"); see also
Sokcnu, supa note 98, at 29 (noting that the SEC looks to tie effectiveness of
compliance procedures in determining whether a company has flly cooperated with
an SEC investigation).
154. See V'LISMANN, supra note 32, at 93 (noting how companies employ law firms
to help navigate the intricacies of global commerce); see alsoALEISSNLANN & SMITH, supra
note 22, at 5-6 (discussing the costs to US businesses as a result of the current FCPA
enoircement environment).
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USS100 million before the lawsuit even begins.155 Recently, Avon
Products disclosed that it spent about USS93.3 million in 2011
on an internal investigation of a possible violation of the
FCPA. 156 As a result, the current FCPA enforcement
environment has been costly to business. 157 The costs of
investigating FCPA violations are borne by the company, and
any resulting fines or penalties accrue entirely to the
government. 158 Accordingly, eighty percent of US companies
have now banned facilitating payments entirely. IM, These
disadvantages have led government agencies to narrowly
interpret the Exception, rendering the Exception practically
illusory in US business practice.' to
155. See Peter J. Henning, The \lounting Costs of Internal Investigations. N.Y. TIMES
DLALBOOK BLOG (May. 5, 2012, 11:07 AM), htlp:,'// s.dcalbook.n)ytiles.con/2012/
03/05/the-mounting-costs-ol-internal-iMvestigations (discussing the ever-increasing
Costs of internal investigations instigated by the government filing charges); see also
Avon Prods., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 12-13, 28 (Feb. 29, 2012)
[hereinafter Avon Form 10-K] (detailing the costs of an internal investigation after the
DOJ filed charges for a possible violation of the FC PA).
156. See Avon Form 10-K, supra note 155, at 28 (surveying the cost of investigating
the possible FCPA violation); see also Henning, supra note 155 (detailing several
comnpanies' respective costs incurred from internal investigations while noting that
Siemens AG reportedly incurred costs of more than US$l billion).
157. See XXISSMIANN & SMITH, supra note 22, at 5-6 (noting how the FCPA has
been costly to business): see also Lanny A. Breuer. Assistant Att'y Gen.. Crim. Div.,
Prepared Address at the 22nd National Forum on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Nov. 17, 2009), available at http: //wwwjustic.gov/criminal/pr/ speches-tesLimony/
doctumen s/1-17-09aagbreucr-remarks-f pa.pdf [hereinaftcr Breuer Address] ("We
recognize the issue of costs to companies to implement robust compliance programs,
to hire outside counsel to conduct in-depth intcrnal investigations, and to torego
certain business opportunities that are tainted with corruption. Those costs are
significant and we are very aware of that fact. The cost of not being FCPA compliant,
however. can be far higher.").
158. See WEISSNLANN & SMITH, supra note 22. at 6 (discussing how US companies,
and not the US government, incur all the costs of FCPA investigations); see also Thomas
Fox, What is the Cost of FCPA Compliance (or Non-Compliance)?, (ORP. COMPLIANCE
INSIGHTS Junc 3, 2010), http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.co /ftpa-
compliance-costs (discussing how the cost for companies to defend themselves in FCPA
investigations can cost as much as hundreds of millions of dollars).
159. Richard L. Cassin, Surveying FCPA Compliance, FCPA BLOG (Oct. 14, 2008.
8:04PM) ,http:/iwww l'cpablog.com iblogi2008i I)i 15/s urveying-fc'pa-
compliance.htil: Kliause & Wiygul, supra notc 109, at 4 (noting that while numbers
vary, some surveys show that seven-y-five percent to eighty percent of US companies
have internal policies that ban or limit the use oflacilitating payments).
160. See.lordan, supra notc 63, at 906-07 (remarking how several commentators
have discussed the narrowing of the Exception's scope over tiie).
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Not only is the Exception seldom employed, but
practitioners also argue that maintaining it is hypocritical. 161 The
United States leads the world in anti-corruption efforts, vet
allows a vaguely defined exception for legal bribes. 162 The
facilitation payments exception decreases the positive impact
created by the United States' strong enforcement policies under
the FCPA.1 , As a result, the United States undermines its own
enforcement efforts and its moral status against corruption.6 4
Practitioners have noted that the underlying hypocrisy of the
Exception threatens to undermine this hard-fought status.15
Critics of the Exception argue that allowing these payments
foster a "culture of corruption."1  A company may risk losing
future business if it gains a reputation for paying bribes.1 7
161. See Peeler & Pulley, sopra note 84, at 2 (emphasizing the US anti-corruption
hypocrisy of permitting facilitating payments); see also Koch, supra note 60, at 392
(inlferring how facilitating payments are still bribes).
162. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 1 (criticizing the dichotomy between
the US lead in anti i-corruption ettirts while perimitting a bribe payments): see also Koch,
supra note 59, at 392 (noting that a grease payment is still a bribe).
163. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 6 (describing how the Exception
impacts the United States' image to support the authors' argument of eliminating the
Exception); see also Koch, supra note 59, at 392 ("Whether a payment to a government
official is to expedite a routine government action or to Obtain a contract foir
construction of a hospital, the payment constitutes a bribe with several potential
deleterious eflects.").
164. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 1 (obsexving the effect of the United
States anti-corruption hypocrisy); see also Zeivos, supra note 79, at 253 (discussing how
the FCPA exception can make US-and global-rhetoric about eliminating corruption
seem hypocritical).
165. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 2 (detailing the evolution of US anti-
corruption efforts); see also Zervos, supra note 79, at 268 ("The dilference is that US
foireign policy rhetoric consistently aspires to much higher standards foir the United
States. Given its claims to be a city on the hill," especially with regard to corruption, the
United States is much more vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy than other
countries. The moralistic rhetoric surrounding corruption implicitly and explicitly
boasts that the United States is more ethical than the rest of the world.").
166. See Krause & Wiygul, supra note 109, at 3 (discussing international
enfircement activity and noting how opponents of facilitating payments argue that
these payimcnts foster a culture of corruption); see also Richard L. Cassin, Clinton Blasts
Faciitati g Payments Exception, FCPA BLOG (June 13, 2011 5:32 AM),
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/6/13/clinton-blasts-facilitating-paytments.hml
(discussing the negative effects of bribei) on business, governments. and democracy).
167. See BIALOs & HUSISIAN, supra note 53, at 116 (discussing how an advantage
enjoyed by US firms is that many non-US officials already know that US firms are
bound by the FCPA and noting that once a company earns a reputation of paying
1914 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOU[7RNAL [Vol. 35:1884
Commentators note that a more aggressive FCPA is essential
because a weak FCPA would undermine the crucial role the
FCPA plays in helping US companies resist demands for bribes
abroad as the price of access to international markets and
opportunities.I's A company that clearly and publicly declines to
pay bribes will find that, in time, bribes are no longer
demanded. 16- If officials face zero tolerance for bribery in even
the smallest demands, then a culture of corruption will not
easily flourish.1 70
To assist in further combating corruption, practitioners
emphasize the importance of maintaining a culture of integrity
within a company171 This culture is essential to avoid legal or
bribes. Lhe number of bribe requests inevitably snowballs); see also Zeivos, supra note
79, at 264 (discussing how some experts view even "small scale" bribery as "extremely
harimful" to business).
168. See generally KLNNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 22, at 27-28 (discussing how
amending the FCPA to make it more "business friendly" would undermine thirty years
of US anti-corruption efforts); see also Daniel Kaufinan & Shang- in We i, Does "Grease
iVoney" Speed Up the Wheels of Conmnerce2 , (World Bank Policy Research Inst., Working
Paper No. 2254, 1999) (demonstrating that bribe takers focus their demands on
companies that have paid bribes before therefire increasing transaction costs).
169. See Alexandra Wrage, Briber's Broken Windows, ETHISPHLRL. QI 2008, at 47-
48 (analogizing petty bribery to the "broken windows" theory advanced by James
Wilson and George Kelling). The theory states that once one broken window is not
repaired, the rest of the windows will eventually be broken. Id. Failing to repairl te first
window is a sign to the world that no one cares about the state of that window. Id. By
analogy, this ycio suggests that facilitating payments should be targeted as
aggressively as higheielevel corruption. Id.: see also Koch, supra note 59. at 392
(elaborating on the application ol the "broken windows hypothesis" to facilitation
payments by suggesting that due to the Exception's "potentially infectious nature," the
ability of lower-level officials to accept bribes encourages highier-level officials to take
more substantial bribes). Ms. Wrage is President of TRACE International, an
association that pools together member resources to provide anti-bribery compliance
solutions for ultinational companies. See About TRICE, TRACE INT'L, https://secure.
traceinternational.org/Trace/about-traceiTrace_International.html (last visited Dec.
29, 2011).
170. See Wrage, supra note 168 at 392 (discussing how eliminating petty bribery
will help curb high-level corruption); see also TRACE INT'L. THE HIGH (COST OE SMALL
BRIBES 3 (2009), a ail be ( https:/iseciure.traceinternational.orgidata/publici
ThicHigh_Cost of SmallBribes_2-65416-1.pdf [hereinafter HIGH COST] (discussing
generally how bribery is bad for business).
171. See Lewis, supra note 153, at 92 (discussing the advantages of fostering a
culture of integrity); see also HIGH COST, supa. note 170, at 3 (noting how companies
that operate abroad report that corruption fosters a permissive atmosphere for other
business crimes, underm ines employee confidence in management, and puts a
company's value and reputation at risk).
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criminal risks because a potential violator will feel that his action
is also against firm culture, further inducing compliant
behavior.172 Practitioners observe that "embedded" principles
that are part of the firm culture will outlast short-term profit
motives. 73 Almost everv country in the world outlaws the use of
facilitation payments under its domestic bribery laws. 174
Additionally, the Exception only applies to the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions and not to the accounting provisions.1 75 For
example, an employee who fails to properly record a payment
made in a non-US jurisdiction that does not permit facilitating
payments of any sort, may result in unintended but detrimental
consequences. I76 Essentially, an employee who accurately
accounts for a facilitating payment is admitting criminal
liability. 177 This moral conundrum creates a strong incentive for
employees to conceal or falsify the use of facilitation
payments.178 US employees thus lose either way. 7 9 On the one
172. See Lewis, supra note 152. at 92 (detailing a beneficial consequence of
maintaining a culture that does not permit corruption); see also High Cost, supra note
170, at 3 (discussing generally how corruption undermines employee confidence).
173. See Lewis, supra note 152, at 92 (observing that principles last longer than
profits); see also Zersos, sopra note 79, at 254 (noting the benefits of eliminating the
Exception in spite of the possibility of "significant losses and inconveniences").
174. See Jordan, supra note 64, at 888 (discussing the Exception's practical
application under domestic law); see also Peeler & Pulley, sopra note 84, at 5 (detailing
the international trend against facilitation payments).
175. See FCPA, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 (2006); see also Jordan, supra note
63, at 888 (noting the Exception's limited application even within the FCPA).
176. See Jordan, supra note 64, at 888 (mentioning the potential for unintended
consequences); see also Patricia Brown Holmes & Valaric Hays, Crease Pay ments are a
Thing oj the Past as Ia Reach of the FCPA Continues to Expard, BLOOIBERt L. RLPS.: RISK
& COMPIlANCE, Mar. 2010, at 1, 1 ("[I]f a US corporation makes a payment that does
in fact fall within the narrow facilitation payment exception, the corporation and its
off icials may still be subjected to criminal prosecution or civil liability if the corporation
does not properly record these payments. The failure to properly record these
payments is a common temptation because recording them creates evidence of a local
law violation .").
177. See Holmes & Hays, supra note 176, at 2 (remarking that failure to properly
record facilitating payments is a common temptation because they create evidence of
violating local law); see also Richard L. Cassin, Another Look at Facilitating Pyenents, FCPA
BLO( (Sept. 11, 2007, 7:14 PM), http://w .fcpablog.com/blog/2007/9/11/anothier-
look-at-facilitating-payel.ntshtm (noting the risks associated with use of facilitating
payments).
178. See Holmes & Hays, supra note 176, at 2 (referring to the failure to accurately
record facilitating payments as a "common temptation"); see also Jordan, supra note 64,
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hand, an employee can choose to properly record the payments
and run the risk of criminal liability under another country's
foreign bribery law.180 On the other hand, an employee can
choose to conceal or falsely record the payments and run the
risk of violating the FCPA's accounting provisions. 'I
Additionally, as a result of the passage of the Bribery Act,
US companies are now forced to closely evaluate their anti-
corruption measures.18 2 In 2011, the United Kingdom began
enforcing its new Bribery Act, referred to as "the FCPA on
steroids.' ' 3 The Bribery Act creates serious implications for US
companies and people operating in the United Kingdom., 4 The
enactment of the Bribery Act has caused many companies to re-
at 888 (describing the strong inducement to conceal the true purpose of facilitating
payments).
179. See ]ordan, supra note 63, at 888 (referring to the situation as a "Catch-22");
see also HOLMES & HA.xs supra note 176, at 2 (noting generally this accounting
conundrum faced by US employees overseas).
180. See Jordan, supra note 63, at 888-89 (noting how domestic US companies
that make and properly record lacilitation payments in compliance with the FCPA can
still find themselves liable foir corruption charges under some other counr)'s foreign
anti-bribery law); see also HOLMES & HAYS, supra note 176, at 2 (discussing how there is
no parallel exception under the accounting provisions thereby exposing US companies
and their officials to liability).
181. See Jordan, supr note 63, at 888 (detailing the "Catch-22" faced by US
companies that use the Exception); see (lso HOLMES & HLAYS, sup a note 176. at 2
(mentioning the alternative option to facing liability, improperly recording pa ments).
182. See Engle, supra note 24, at 1188 ("But, for now at least, companies are under
the strongest pressure to institute procedures and standards so as to have the defense
of adequate procedures in the event one of their employees breaks the law and should
recast any requested facilitation payment contractually."): see also Dunst et al., supra
note 24, at 286 ("In an increasingly global marketplace, it is important that
multinational corporations keenly observe the regulatol) landscape to identify possible
new risks, including extraterritorial anti -corruption legislation, such as the UK Bribe)
Act.").
183. See Acts: Bribery Act 2010. supra note 112 (stating that the Briber) Act catie
into force July 1, 2011); see also Froomkin, supra note 149 (mentioning the nickname
for the Bribery Act).
184. See Deneraly avid Foster ct al., Naw Bribery Act Creates Additional Liability Rsk
for Corporations Doing Business in the UK, O'MELVENY MXLRs LLP (2010), available at
http://ww .omm.coin/fcvsite/abc.aspxurl-ne wsrooi% 2f%-nPDF.aspx%3tfpub%
3d980 (discussing the liability risks for corporations doing business in the United
Kingdom); see also Grime & Zbed, supa note 134, at 10 ("Because of its broad
territorial reach, the Bribery Act's prohibition of facilitating payments poses risks for a
large number of businesses - regardless of any hoped-for exercise of prosecutorial
discre ion."
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evaluate their anti-corruption efforts, even if they have extensive
policies and procedures to comply with legislation such as the
FCPA. 185 A group of panelists from the American Bar
Association ("ABA") agreed that aggressive enforcement of
bribery statutes is an international trend not limited to the
United States.l SThe FCPA is no longer the most restrictive
national statute that imposes anti-corruption standards on
businesses, 187 The existence of a more stringent anti-corruption
law in the United Kingdom has led to speculation that US
enforcement authorities will apply even more pressure to
companies through the FCPA so as "not to be outdone" in this
area of traditional US dominance , The adoption of a more
"business friendly" statute may displace US leadership in the
articulation of global anti-corruption norms.189
185. See DELOTTL FoRLNsIC CTR.. ANTI-CORRUPTION PKA CTICS SURNY 2011:
COUDY WVITH A CHANCE OF PROSECUTION? 3 (2011), http:/iww.deloitte.comi/assetsi
Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%( 2OAssets I/Docunnent Is/F7ASForensicCentler us fas-
u sdic/u sdfc'_ft pa%20compliance%20suir-,ey%20report_090711 .pdf; see aso Engle,
supra note 24, at 1188 ("[The Bribely Act] raise [s] international standards because it
effectively forces corporatlions to institute effective procedures to prevent bribery.").
186. See juliet S. Sorenson, The G!obalization of Anti-Co"ruption Law, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Aug 16, 2011), http://wwv.fcpaprofessor.con/the-globalization-of-anti-
corruption-law (discussing the panelists' consensus at the annual meeting of the
American Bar Association in Toronto titled "The Globalization of Anti-Corruption
Law"). The American Bar Association is a professional association that provides law
school accreditation, continuing legal education, and progriams to assist legal
practitioners. See Oveo iew: About the ABA, AM. BAR ASS'N,
http:/iwww amerieanbar.org/utility/about the aba.html (last visited jan. 3, 2011)
(discussing the ABA's work in serving members of the legal community and acting as a
national representative of the legal profession).
187. See KENNEDY & DANIEISEN, supra note 22, at 23 (observing that several
national statutes prohibit activities not addressed by the FCPA rendering the FCPA no
longer the most restrictive national statutes); see also WLSSMANN & SMITH, supra note
22, at 5 (noting the passage of the Bribe) Act and the view that it is more "far-
reaching" than the FCPA in several key ways).
188. See WLSSMANN & SMITH, supra note 22. at 5 ("It will take time to determine
whether fars of competitive enforcement policies are prescient or untounded."); see
also GIBSON DUNN, supa note 88. at 30-31 (detailing how the passage of the Bribery
Act moved the United Kingdom to the foreiront of the global light against corruption
and warning that FCPA compliance does not necessary ensure compliance with the
Bribel) Acts provisions).
189. See KLNNEDY & DANIELSEN, s'upra note 22, at 28 (highlighting this potential
consequence of adopting amendments proposed by the US Chamber of Commerce
which would tender the FCPA more "business tiendly"): see also Zelvos, supra note 79,
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B. Creating A More "B usiness Friendly "FCPA
Commentators opposed to making the FCPA a more
aggressive statute argue in favor of amending the statute to
make it more "business-friendly. '" ' 0 These critics argue that the
FCPA in its current form harms US business interests abroad,
and that the focus should be on improving the enforcement
regimes of other nations. v-
The primary theme throughout the 2010 Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act congressional hearing was that the current state of
FCPA enforcement might harm US business interests. 192
American companies involved in international business
continue to perceive corruption as a significant obstacle to
business, 1 -  In a 2008 surey of more than 2,700 business
executives in twenty-six countries, Transparency International
found that international officials in public institutions
demanded a bribe payment from nearly forty percent of the
business executives polled. 94 In many countries, bribery is still
part of the ordinary course of business.1-5 Evidence supports the
at 253, 268 (noting US hypocrisy tor articulating a Strong anti-corruption stance while
permitting petty bribes).
190. SeeF1VEISSMANN & SMITH, s urpa note 22, at 5 (proposing five potential reiorms
in light of the FCPA's harm to business). But see KLNNLDY & DANIELSLN, supra note 22,
at 5 (opposing Weissmann & Smith's proposed amendments).
191. See Entorcement Hearing, supra note 87, at 18 (emphasizing the need to
focus on helping other countries improve Lhcir enforcement programs); see also
)ionne Searcey, In Antibribey Law, Some Fear Iradv erertt Chill on Bsir es, \ALL ST..J.,
Aug. 6, 2009, at A9 (noting in particular the scholarship discussing the Lear of chilling
business in emerging markets).
192. See geterally House Heairg, supra note 131 (noting this theme that was
present throughout the hearing).
193. See KLNNEDY & DANIELSEN, supra note 22, at 18 (highlighting a 2009 survey
by Ernst & Young, a global accounting lirm, that found that one in four respondents
reported that their company had experienced an incident of bribery or corruption over
the course of 2007 and 2008, and eighteen percent knew their company had lost
business to a competitor wvho had paid a bribe).
194. TRANSPARENCY INT'L, (LOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT xxv (2009), available at
http://wNv.transparency.org/publications/gCr (follow "Click here to download the
report" hyperlink and select the report in the appropriate language); see also ILNNNEDY
& DANIELSEN, supra note 22, at 19 (interpreting the Transparency International smuVey
to demonsuatc that the challenges that led to the passage of the FCPA still exist).
195. See WEISMANN, supra note 32, at 93 ("In many countries, bribery is the
ordinary course of business and even tax deductible."); see also Press Release, Regional
Anti -Corruption Initiative. 2nd India Summit on Anti -Corruption Oct. 17-18, 2011 -
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idea that the FCPA has made US business less competitive than
their international counterparts who do not have significant
FCPA exposure. 19 A 1999 Congressional Research Service
report to Congress referenced an estimate that the FCPA's anti-
bribery provisions had lost up to one billion dollars annually in
US export trade. 97 Between May 1, 2003 and April 30, 2004, the
US Department of Commerce has estimated that the bribery of
non-US officials may have affected competition for forty-seven
contracts worth US$18 billion. 198 Of these forty-seven contracts,
US firms lost at least eight contracts worth USS3 billion. 199
Notably, about thirty percent of respondent companies have
decided against doing business in countries where the perceived
risk of non-compliance was too high. 200
Anecdotal evidence indicates that the demand for illicit
payments has significantly increased in recent years as new
markets have permitted international investment and
procurement. 211 James R. Hines, Jr., formerly of the John F.
Muinbai, India. http://wv.rai-sce.org/ evnts/ upcoming-events /988-2nd-india-
summit-on-anti-corruption-october-17-18-201 l-mumbai-india.html (last visited Dec. 1,
2011) ("Rccent corruption scandals including the tcelcoms case make it clear that
corruption remains a serious problem in India.").
196. See MICHAEL V. SEITZINGER ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30079,
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (1999); DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ADDRESSING THE
(HALLENGES OF INTERNATIONAL BRIBERY & FAIR (OMPETITION vi, 22-24 (2004),
available at http: w/w.uisifo.org/enusgovernminent/lorpolicyidocsi/exp OOO95 Ipdf
(expressing concern that a number of counties that have ratified thc OECD
Convention still do not have specific legislative provisions to fulfill obligations under
thc OECD Convention and further comparing enfircement practices of other nations
noting that some countries, particularly those whose firms are very active in export
markets, have been slow to apply enlorce resources).
197. See SEITZINGER ET Al. supra note 196 (listing the estimated losses sustained
in export trade as a result of the FCPA).
198. L)LP'T OF COMMERCE, supa note 196, at vi (noting the US Department of
Commerce's estimate regarding iLthe FCPA's financial impact to US business acquisition
abroad).
199. L)LP'T OF (OMMERCE, supra note 196, at vi (detailing precisely how many
contract US businesses lost).
200. FULBRIGHT & JAWvORsiK LLP, FIFTH ANNAUL LITIGATION TRENDS SURVLY
FINDINGS: DIRECTION AND DYNAMICS, 34 (2008), available at http://www.fulbright.com/
miediaroom/files/2008/Fulbright-FifthLiTreinds.pdf
201. See BiALOs & HUSISLAN, supra note 53, at 13 (observing how this type of
corruption is most prevalent in post-communist states where the rule of law is largely
undeveloped); see also Christopher L. Hall, The Foreig Corrupt Practices Act: A
Competitive Disadvatage., But For How Long?, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 289, 304-05
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Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, analyzed
the impact of the FCPA on US investment in emerging markets
through four indicators of US business activity: federal direct
investment, capital-to-labor ratios, joint venture activity, and
aircraft exports. 2 2 Hines concluded that all four indicators
decreased after the passage of the FCPA in 1977.201 As a result,
he posited that anti-bribery legislation deterred investment in
countries where bribery is perceived to be relatively prevalent.2114
Hines observed that while US business activity decreased in
corrupt countries, no evidence suggested that total international
business activity decreased2 5 He suggested that multinational
firms, unconstrained by anti-bribery legislation, might have
replaced US activitv.20
Commentators and practitioners have subsequently argued
that the present FCPA enforcement regime ultimately deters US
investment from emerging markets2 7 Andrew Spalding, visiting
(1994) (bemoaning that the countries that often provide the most dynamic markets for
US businesses are also those most fraught with corruption).
202. See james R. Hines, jr., Forbidder Pa3irnent: Foreign Bribery and Anericar
Business After 1977, 15-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 5266,
1995), available at http://www.nbier.org/papers/w5266.org (analyzing the behavior of
US lirms belore and after the passage of the FCPA to draw indirect inferences about
the effccts of this legislation on US business activity); see also Searcey, supra note 191
(noting that the view that fighting bribery is "detrimental to investment in emerging
markets has been around for awhile citing both Mr. Hines's research and I)r. Andrew
Brady Spalding's subsequent rescarch").
203. See Hines, supra note 202. at 19 (noting the significant effcct of US anti-
bribery legislation on business operations in corrupt countries); see also Searcey, sopra
note 191 (recognizing soie commentators' arguments that the FCPA harns business
interests).
204. See Hines, sopra note 202, at 19-20 (interpreting the result, on the four
dimensions of behavior of US firms); see alsoWeinograd, supra note 152, at 527 ("When
operating in a country where facilitation payments are the norn, such a polic might
even encourage a corporation to divest.").
205. See Hines, supra note 202, at 19 (noting this effect on US business activity
compared to the opposite effect on international business); see also Laura E.
longobardi, Re ie ,g ,he Situation: What Is o Be Done With the Foreign Corrupt Practices
ActP, 20 VAND.. TRANSNAT'1 L. 431, 447 (1987) (discussing the deleterious impact on
US business abroad).
206. See Hines, sopra note 202, at 19-20 (detailing what may have led
international business activity to remain the same while US business activity declined).
207. See Spalding, sup a note 78, at 351 (emphasizing this deterrence from
emerging markets); see also Weinograd, sopra note 152, at 527 (observing how the
present FCPA enforcement regime has led some companies to routinely err on the side
of caution and noting that this polic might encourage a corporation to divest).
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professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, emphasized how
this effect is contrary to the FCPA's purpose to build economic
and political alliances by promoting ethical overseas
investment. 20s These commentators posit that capital-rich
countries that are not committed to effectively enforcing anti-
bribery measures fill the resulting foreign direct investment
void20 9 Companies that are subject to anti-bribery legislation are
now investing less in countries where bribery is perceived to be
more prevalent210 The decrease in investment results from a
company evaluating the risks of engaging in decision-making in
uncertain conditions where a risk of corruption exists. 2 1
Spalding posits that the US Congress's tacit purpose was to force
all countries to adopt FCPA-like regulations21 2 As a result, these
regulations have induced international investors to reduce their
investments in corrupt countries.2 1,
As a result of this void, practitioners and government
officials point to the need to increase enforcement of domestic
anti-bribery statutes abroad to eliminate competitive
disadvantages 2 14 The United States is the undisputed leader in
enforcement actions by quickly distinguishing itself through its
208. Spalding, supra note 78, at 351 (observing how the present enforcement
regime is contrary to the FCPA's legislative historical purpose).
209. See id., at 351 (discussing how these unintended sanctions on emerging
markets result in these counUes filling the toreign direct investment void).
210. See id.; see also Spalding, sopra note 78, at 355 (noting how the FCPA's impact
has led to this additional and more problematic outcome); see also Alvaro (uelvo-
(azurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Agaiast Bribei7 Abroad, 39 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 634. 634
(2008) (observing how legislation to punish bribery is not effective in countries with
high corruption).
211. See BL LoS & HUSISIAN, supra note 53. at 74-76 (discussing the decisions
made by management in emerging markets that revolve around the inevitably that
some risk" of a corrupt payment exists).
212. See Spalding, supra note 78, at 356 (arguing that enforcement agencies
intend the current enforcement levels to force other nations to adopt similar regimes).
213. See id. (noting the consequence of the proliferation of FCPA-likc
regulations); see also Weinograd, supra note 152, at 528 (observing how companies are
unwilling to engage in certain international transactions when facing weighty financial
penalties, the stigna attached to criminal liabilit,, and potential ineligibility tor future
government contLracts).
214. See Enforcement Hearing, supra note 86, at 18 (arguing in favor of
encouraging the increase of anti-corruption enoircement worldwide); see also
Carrington, supra note 4, at 142-43 (noting that enircement must be "re-energized").
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"rabid enforcement" of the FCPA. 215 Markedly, the United
States has pursued more anti-corruption prosecutions than any
other nation. 216 Members of the US Congress as well as
practitioners observe that international efforts against bribery
need to increase because the United States cannot be the only
enforcer. 2I7 These practitioners emphasize the need to assist
other countries in improving their enforcement regimes. 218
While all countries have laws that punish bribery to reduce the
demand for bribes by politicians and other government officials,
not all countries are equal to the United States in terms of
number of prosecutions2 ' Relatively few countries other than
the United States have initiated prosecutions or even serious
investigations of bribery involving non-US officials. 220
215. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 2 (emphasizing that the United States is
still the clear leader in today's anti-corruption enlorcement charge); see also Hon. Dick
Thornburgh, Foreword to HECTOR GONZALEZ & CLAUDIUS 0. SOKENU, FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ENFORCEMEINT A TER US. V. KAY, at ii (2006) (" [F]or no
nation over the past several years has enforced its anticorruption laws as vigorously as
the United States.").
216. See Peeler & Pulley, supra note 84, at 3 (noting the United States' lead in
enforcement actions); see also ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION ANT)
DEVELOPMENT, WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY: 2010 DATA ON ENFORCEMIENT OF THE
ANTi-BRIBERY CONVENTION 6 (2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoccd/47/
39/47637707.pdf (detailing an OECD enforcement study that reported approximately
two hundred and sixty ongoing investigations in fifteen parties to the OE(i)
Convention wvith 150 investigations stemming from one country, the United States).
217. See Enforcemient Hearing, supra note 88, at 18 ("You cannot be the only
enforcer in the world and expect to clean up tre world. That is not [the United States']
role."); see also Searcey, supra note 196 (discussing the need to improve enforcement
worldwide).
218. See Enforcemient Hearing, supra note 86, at 18 (noting the emphasis placed
by Michael Volkov, partner at US law firm Mayer Brown, on the need to improve other
nations' enforcement regincs): see also Scarcey, supra note 191 (Citing Nancy Boswell,
President of Transparency International-USA, who stated "The FCPA is the benchmark
for where we think other governments should be .... What's essential is consistent,
concerted action by all exporting nations to enforce bribex-y prohibition.").
219. See Sorenson. supra note 186 (decefing the United States the "undisputed
leader" in aggressive enforcement ol bribery statutes); see also Cuervo-Cazurra, sopra
note 210, at 634 (observing that legislation to curb bribe) is not eftfctive in countries
with high corruption).
220. See FRITz HLINILNN & (iLLIAN DELL, TRANSPAMEN(CY iNTL, PROGRESS REPORT
2010: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY (ONVENTION 11 (3d ed. 2010),
available at http://wtw.Lransparency.org/publications/publications/conventiols/
oeed-report_2010 (discussing findings of comparative enforcement programs); see also
Marceau, supra note 91, at 287 (noting the United States' cominitllent to aggressively
prosecute FCPA violations).
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Significantly, Transparency International identifies only six
other countries besides the United States that qualify as "active"
in their prosecution of overseas briber-. 21 Such legislation,
however, is not always effective especially in countries with high
corruption, where judges may be open to accept a bribe in
exchange for altering the application of anti-corruption law
within theirjurisdiction 22
III. REPEAL THE FACILITATING PA 1'WENATS EXCEPTION
Eliminating the Exception follows the trend of establishing
more aggressive international standards that prohibit facilitating
payments. Amending the statute to take a more forceful stance
would also ideologically align the FCPA with the DOJ's desire to
have a strong position against corruption. Part III emphasizes
the potential advantages US businesses stand to gain with the
elimination of the Exception. Part III.A discusses how
eliminating the Exception dismisses the accusations of hypocrisy
and prevents US companies from falling prey to the "slippery
slope" of bribe demands. Part I11.B details how a bright line rule
against all forms of corruption helps remove the inherent
problems and risks associated with use of the Exception. Finally,
Part III.C emphasizes the importance of the United States being
able to reestablish its leadership role for aggressively fighting
corruption abroad.
A. Cojbrning to the New International Norm
The purpose behind the Exception's inclusion in the FCPA
is now obsolete. The prohibition against corruption is no longer
limited to the developed world. 223 Only five countries, including
the United States, permit legal bribes.2 24 Notably, the Australian
221. See HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 220, at 11. The six other counties are
Denmark, Germany, Italy, Norway, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Id.
222. See Cucivo-Cazurra, s'upra note 210, at 634 (noting the ineffectiveness of
legislation that prosecutes overseas bribery); see also Carrington, supra note 4, at 130
(discussing generally the problem of officials who seek bribes).
223. See supra notes 78-84 and accompanying text (discussing the United States'
successful elforts to encourage global anti-corruption eflorts).
224. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (listing the four other countries
that permit facilitating paymcnts: Australia. Canada, New Zealand. and South Korea).
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government, one of the five countries that permit facilitating
payments, is currently considering eliminating the Exception. 225
At the time of the Exception's enactment, Congress noted its
corrosive effects and adopted the Exception as a "necessary
evil.'" 22 The global business climate was rife with corruption and
Arnerican corporations, subject to the FCPA, were at a
significant disadvantage. 227 The passage of the OECD
Convention along with the subsequent enactments of anti-
corruption statutes by the OECD signatory nations evidences the
prevailing global anti-corruption climate. 22, The United States is
no longer at a competitive disadvantage because US companies
transact and compete with nations that now have similar anti-
corruption statutes in place. 229 As a result, the underlying
reasoning behind the need for the facilitating payments
exception no longer exists. The majority of the international
community prohibits the use of facilitating payments. 2- ° The
OECD actively discourages the use of facilitating payments and
the Bribery Act prohibits its use. 2- 1 It is clear that the United
States is no longer fighting alone to end corruption in
international business transactions.
Notably, eighty percent of US companies do not even
permit use of the facilitating payments exception as part of their
corporate policy: -2 As a result of the statute's ambiguity, US
companies are weary of allowing their employees to pay
225. See sup a note 102 and accompanying text (noting the Australian
government's current position vis-a-vis its statute's facilitating payments exception).
226. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text (detailing Congress's view
toward facilitating payments at tire tile of the FCPA's passage).
227. See supra note 76 and accompanying text (mentioning the concern of a
competitive disadvantage that drove the creation of the Exception).
228. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text (noting the passage of the
OECD and subsequent acceptance by its signatorv nations).
229. See supa notes 80-83 and accompanying text (noting the FCPA's influence
on the proliferation of anti-bribery statutes worldwide).
230. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (observing that only four countries
outside the United States permit the use of facilitating payments).
231. See supra Part I.C (discussing the OECD and Bribe) Act's stance on
facilitating payments and their influence in international standard setting).
232. See supra note 207 and accompanying text (detailing the infrlequent use of
the Exception by US companies to evade prosecution).
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facilitating payments for fear of prosecution.2 33 With the advent
of the Bribery Act, US companies will use the Exception even
more sparingly, rendering it virtually useless. The Exception still
harms business interests, however, despite its infrequent use.
B. Eliminating the Problems Associated with the Exception's Use
The Exception harms US business interests as a result of its
ambiguity, with no clear delineation as to its scope. In particular,
the definition of "routine governmental action" is an example
of how the scope of the Exception is unclear. 234 The US
Congress attempted to clarify the meaning of "routine
governmental action" by delineating actions that fall under its
definition.235 Despite this clarification, the definition's "catch-
all" provision for "actions of a similar nature" renders the
statute ultimately vague2 - The list is therefore non-exhaustive
and does not provide the requisite clarity as to the Exception's
outer limits.
The Exception's scope is especially unclear because the
FCPA does not delineate a limit to the amount that may be
legally paid under the Exception. 237 The facilitating payment
need not be de minimis. 238 The United States does not limit
facilitating payments to "small" payments, unlike the OECD. 239
This difference is significant because a facilitating payment may
233. See supra notes 139, 163-64 and accompanying text (discussing US
companies' fears of prosecution as a result of the Fxception's ambiguity regarding its
scope).
234. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (noting the Exception's
language generally and in particular noting "actions of a similar nature" which is the
final example of "routine governmental action").
235. Se sup) note 30 and accompanying text (listing potential actions listed in
the FCPA that maybe permitted for facilitating payments).
236. See supra note 73 and accompanying text (detailing the Exception's language
with regard to the definitions listed for "routine governmental action").
237. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (detailing the Exception's plain
language which provides no limitation to facilitating payments).
238. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (reviewing thre Exception's
language).
239. See supra notes 104, 140-43 and accompanying text (reviewing how the
OECD explicitly provides foir "small" payments in contrast to the US' position which
does not have a specific delineation); see also, supra note 72 and accompanying text
(noting the OECD's limitation on facilitating payments while the United States has no
similar limitation and the significance of this difierence).
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potentially be a large sum of money2 40 While legal under the
statute's "plain" language, this transaction would immediately
be suspect and subject to DOJ inquiries.2 41 A US company would
then be forced to defend itself by expending more resources in
employing their legal team to handle any potential DOJ
investigation. '42
This ambiguity has created substantial financial difficulties
for US businesses, most notably in compliance. US companies
have spent substantial amounts of money in creating overzealous
compliance programs. 243 Repealing the Exception would
provide a bright line rule for all US companies to adhere to: all
bribes are illegal. A clearer rule remedies the ambiguity of the
statute and enables lawyers and practitioners to more easily
comply with the FCPA while transacting abroad.2 44
The DOJ attempts to compensate for the ambiguity of the
Exception with the Lay Person's Guide and the Opinion
Procedure mechanism. 245 These attempts, however, are
ineffective. The Lay Person's Guide provides scant clarification
while the Opinion Procedure tool is too time-consuming. While
abroad, US companies are subject to cultural and political
pressures that dictate timelines that force decisions to be made
within a short period of time. 24 Companies cannot afford to wait
240. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text (mentioning that inherent
problems associated with no limitation on facilitating payments).
241. See supra note 142 and accompanying text ("However, tie greater the value
of an expediting payment, the more likely enforcement olficials will view the payment
as being suspect and not a legitimate expediting paynit."); see also supra notes 20, 105
and accompanying text (observing how tire anount of the tacilitating payment is not
limited nor specified).
242. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (describing the expenses
borne by US companies in investigating potential FCPA violations).
243. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (observing that inefficient
compliance progriams are a result of the Exception's anbiguity).
244. See supra note 156 and accompanying tcxt (noting how government has not
provided enough guidance to companies to enable them to elfectively comply with the
F1PA).
245. See supra notcs 16. 54-59 and accompanying text (describing the Lay
Person's Guide and Opinion Procedure mechanism).
246. See sup)a note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the tilie and political
pressures involved in negotiating overseas).
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for an advance ruling before proceeding with a business
transaction. 247
Moreover, merely employing the Opinion Procedure
mechanism may subject a US company or employee to liability.
Use of the mechanism amounts to a written admission of a bribe
especially since the proposed transaction must be described in
detail. 248 This detailed admission may serve to implicate a
company of violating the FCPA. In the event of an unfavorable
ruling, the DQJ may subsequently heavily scrutinize the conduct
of the US company in question leading to further compliance
costs. 249 As a result of these flaws, most companies do not even
employ the Opinion Procedure mechanism, thus rendering it
even more ineffective. 250
Even if the US Congress further clarifies the Exception, all
forms of bribery should be prohibited. Simply stated: bribery is
bad for business. Once a company earns a reputation for paying
bribes, international officials will demand more bribes with each
subsequent business transaction. 51 This, in turn, increases the
costs of doing business abroad for American companies. 252 As
the number of officials requesting bribes increase, ultimately,
these expediting payments may evolve to become improper
payments.25 Moreover, a bribe is not a guarantee that the job
will be performed, and awards a foreign official leverage over US
companies. Once a bribe is paid, a US company becomes subject
to a foreign official's whim because the company cannot seek
legal recourse. A corporate policy that permits the payment of
247. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (noting the thirty-day timeline. with
the possibility of an extension, to receive an Opinion Procedure ruling).
2 4 8. See supra note 56 and accompanying text (describing what thye DOJ requires
of a company belore it provides a ruling).
249. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text (mentioning the compliance
costs that US companies face).
250. See supra note 152 and accompanying text (noting how the mechanism is
rarely used by most US companies).
251. Seesupra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (detailing the "slippel) slope"
of bribery payments).
252. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting how this incorporated tax
increases transactions costs generally).
253. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text (discussing how the increasing
demand tor facilitating payinents leads to a "slippel) slope" that may lead to illegal
bribes).
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bribes breeds further corruption that increases both financial
and transactional costs for US businesses in the long run25 4 US
companies would not fall prey to this "slippery slope" of
corruption if the Exception is repealed.255
Furthermore, permitting legal bribes while promoting a
culture against corruption is contradictory and hypocritical.
Repealing the Exception permits US companies to effectively
promote a culture of integrity. This culture is essential to avoid
legal and criminal risks in business transactions by ensuring
compliance to anti-corruption policies256 The potential violator
must feel that her action is not only illegal but also against
company conscience257 Failure to install active measures against
corruption permits "employees and third parties to rationalize
stealing from the company." 258 Eliminating the Exception will
enable US companies to consistently decline all bribes so that, in
time, bribes are no longer demanded259
Consistently declining bribes allows US companies to build
a strong anti-corruption policy and be forthcoming about their
expectations in business transactions. 260 The FCPA will
effectively become a shield against less scrupulous foreign
officials seeking to take advantage of US business interests.26 By
254. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (discussing the increased costs in
the long run).
255. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting the benefits of repealing
the Exception).
256. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (detailing the importance of a
culture of integrity).
257. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (suggesting that the importance
sterns fiOil creating a corporate culture against corruption so that an employee feels
not only morally against corruption but also feels that he is in violation of wvell-settled
corporate policy).
258. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (noting how a corporate culture
that permits facilitating payments creates a permissive atmosphere where employees
feel that they may do other illegal acts).
259. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (detailing how, in tiie, bribes
would no longer be demanded of a country that consistently reirains irom paying
bribes).
260. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (observing the benefits of a strong
anti-corruption policy).
261. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text (noting how the FCPA would
become a shield to detnd against corruption in US business transactions abroad).
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eliminating the Exception, US companies will foster a culture of
integrity free of corrupt outside influence.
The companies that do permit the use of facilitating
payments do so at the risk of setting conflicting standards.262
While facilitating payments are permitted under US law, these
payments are prohibited domestically in every nation. 263 Thus,
US employees required to properly account for all facilitating
payments made abroad must either abide by US law or protect
themselves from liability under local law264 US employees are
effectively between Scylla and Charybdis, compelled to choose
which "monster" to face.
As a result, US employees are forced to effectively
document a bribe and face FCPA liability if the facilitating
payment falls outside the scope of the Exception. 265 This
documentation further amounts to a signed confession of
wrongdoing in the host country exposing the US employee to
liability under local law.261 Abiding by local law, therefore, forces
an employee to creatively account for the legal bribe,.26 If the
payment is improperly recorded, the issuer is subject to SEC
enforcement. 26 In a company that emphasizes a culture of
integrity, use of the Exception directly contradicts this culture.
Repealing the Exception thus removes the significant risks
involved with the Exception's use and helps promote a
corporate culture firmly against corruption.
262. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing the hypocrisy of
voicing an aggressive anti-corruption stance while permitting bribes in the form of
facilitating payments).
263. See supra note 181 and accompanying text (noting the conundrum US
employees face as a result of the illegalitv of facilitating payments under local domestic
law).
264. See sup)a note 52 and accompanying text (observing the difficult choice US
employees la:e w hen accounting for lacilitating payments).
265. See upra notes 182-83 and accompanying text (discussing the consequence
of accurately recording a facilitating payment).
266. See suipra note 182 and accompanying text (observing how a proper record of
facilitating payment amounts to a confession of paying a bribe).
267. See supra notes 182. 185 and accompanying text (noting the alternate choice
faced by US employees when accounting for facilitating payments).
268. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (observing the penalty for
improperly recording payments).
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Concededly, corrupt governments and companies may not
want to negotiate with US businesses as a result of eliminating
the Exception, transacting instead with countries that have
weaker enforcement regimes. Obtaining contracts in particularly
corrupt countries may virtually cease as a result of eliminating
the Exception. Particularly in emerging markets, countries with
strong anti-bribery enforcement may be at a disadvantage
compared to countries with weaker enforcement provisions2 N9 A
void of American influence in certain emerging markets is not
in the United States' best interests. The Exception assists US
companies in overcoming this hurdle.
These initial obstacles, however, may not be as daunting as
perceived given the current international anti-corruption
climate. As practitioners accurately note, rhetoric is meaningless
when countries do not enforce their respective anti-corruption
statutes.27 The current reality is that other countries do not
enforce their respective anti-corruption statutes as aggressively
as the United States.271 The United States is effectively leveling
the playing field by enforcing the FCPA's provisions worldwide.
Significantly, the United States has recently increased FCPA
enforcement actions substantially. 272 Without these efforts,
international companies under weaker anti-corruption regimes
are able to pay bribes without fear of penalty.273 The global anti-
bribery trend, however, will lead to greater enforcement actions
worldwide, especially if current US enforcement levels continue
and the United Kingdom begins enforcing the Bribery Act's
provisions. 4
269. See supra notes 214, 217 and accompanying text (noting the potential
comrpetitive disadvantage where two countries may have diffecring enforcemnent
policies).
270. See supra notes 85. 201. 219-27 and accompanying text (discussing the US
lead in anti-corruption entorcement and the competitive disadvantage that exists when
other nations lail to enforce their anti-corruption statutes).
271. See upra notes 224-26 and accompanying text (comparing other countries'
enforcement actiLvties to the United States' cnforcement).
272. See s pra notes 87-94 and accompanying text (observing the United States'
recent increased entforcecilnt of violatioIs of the FCPA).
273. See sup a note 227 and accompanying text (noting a consequence of being
the leader in enforcement activity).
274. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (detailing the Bribery Act's
greater extraterritorial reach relative to the FCPA and its significance).
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The more appropriate response lies in encouraging
stronger enforcement regimes abroad-as the United States has
been demonstrating. The Bribery Act, with its broader
extraterritorial reach, will induce global businesses to reconsider
their own policies regarding bribes275 The United Kingdom and
United States are major trading partners and big players in
international business. Commentators have posited that this
increase in enforcement is a means for the United States to
encourage anti-corruption enforcement in countries with
weaker enforcement procedures or internal controls. 276
Enforcing the FCPA provisions against non-US businesses alerts
other nations to the need to enforce their domestic anti-bribery
provisions. 277
With the prevalence of increased enforcement and
international anti-corruption cooperation, other nations will feel
pressure to comply with higher standards. Free media and other
markers of transparency are important players in the global
marketplace. The importance of maintaining a good reputation
is more important than ever.2 78 The cost to a company of
reputational damage due to revelations of corruption can be far
higher than "the financial cost of investigation."279 Just as the
United States pushed for the advent of a global anti-corruption
climate in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States is now pushing
for stronger enforcement procedures worldwide.28 1
275. See sup a note 185 and accompanying text (noting the potential eftfct of the
Bribery Act's passage on global business policies).
276. See sup]a note 217 and accompanying text (discussing the argumnent that the
recent increase in US enforcement is a neans to induce other nations to similarly
increase their enforcement activities).
277. See supra note 218 and accompanying text (noting the cffect of the United
States' increased enforcement efforts).
278. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (noting how reputations outlast
profits).
279. See supra note 22 and accompanying tCxt (observing the consequences of a
damaged reputation).
280. See supra Part LB (chronicling the United States' role as a leader in
combating bribery abroad beginning in the 1970s); see also supra notes 223-25 and
accompanying text (detailing the United States' lead in combating international
corruption thirough its work with thc OECD and comparing other countries'
entoorcement measures to tre United States' recent increase in entorcement activiw).
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C. Re-Establishing the United States as a Leader Against Corruption
Although the United States began the crusade against
global corruption in the 1970s, it has now fallen behind.281 The
UK's Bribery Act is more aggressive and does not permit the use
of facilitation payments 282 Moreover, the OECD now actively
discourages the use of facilitation payments and openly criticizes
the United States for maintaining this Exception. 283 Once the
leader, the United States now lags behind the global trend
toward an increasingly aggressive position towards all forms of
corruption.2 4 While the United States leads the world in anti-
corruption enforcement measures, it has fallen behind in
instituting a more aggressive statute. The US stance against
corruption thus borders on hypocrisy.28, US rhetoric calls for
strong measures to combat corruption abroad but enables US
companies to pay bribes to government officials for certain
services. If the United States is going to push for other countries
to increase enforcement of their respective anti-corruption
statutes, the United States should itself lead by example.
Eliminating the Exception for facilitating payments would
facilitate this result.
The United States should lead by example by amending the
FCPA to align with the Bribery Act. This alignment is important
in part because of the Bribery Act's greater extraterritorial
reach. US companies now may be subject to enforcement
actions under the Bribery Act.18b Eliminating the facilitating
payments exception ensures that US companies do not violate
the Bribery Act. Further, eliminating the facilitating payments
281. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text (detailing the United States'
eiforts beginning the 1970s to fight corruption abroad).
282. See supra notes 119-31 and accompanying text (detailing both the FCPA and
the Bribery Act's provisions).
283. See supra Part IC (noting the OFCID's current stance toward facilitating
payments).
284. See supa notes 113, 131 and accompanying text (emphasizing the
international stnce against lacilitating payments).
285. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (highlighting the hypocrisy
involved with maintaining an Exception that permits bribes while enfircing anti-
corruption violations aggressively).
286. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (detailing the Bribe) Act's
extraterritorial reach and its significance in comparison to the FCPA).
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exception ensures that the United States is upholding the global
trend. The Exception should be recognized for what it is: a bribe
that is illegal in every country's domestic anti-corruption statute
and prohibited from use in business transactions by most
international players.2 7 Repealing the Exception would signal to
the international community that the United States is a true
leader in the fight against corruption in international business
transactions.
COACLUSION
Ultimately, the facilitating payments exception poses more
problems than benefits to US companies. Eliminating the
facilitating payments exception will enable companies to enact
more effective compliance programs and also provide clearer
guidance for engaging in international business transactions.
The global trend to eliminate the facilitating payments
exception is significant. The trend signals that the United States
is no longer the only country fighting corruption in business
transactions. This trend also demonstrates how the United States
has fallen behind as the leader against corruption in business
transactions. In spite of the United States remaining the leader
in enforcement actions, it no longer has the most powerful anti-
corruption statute on the books. Significantly, the UK's Bribery
Act is now in force and its provisions are more aggressive than
the FCPA. The United States should eliminate the Exception in
order to regain its position as the lead crusader against
corruption. Instead of increasing enforcement of a weaker and
ambiguous statute, the US Congress should amend the FCPA so
that US companies and global businesses adhere to its standards.
287. See supra notes 100-03. 167. 179 and accompanying text (discussing the
international Stance against the Exception and the international comniuniLy's
prohibition against the Exception in domestic statutes).
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